

# Part 5: Introduction to the

# Korean War Veterans Memorial.

# Background. The Korean War Veterans Memorial is a sobering place to work. You might be dismayed at the number of visitors who stumble into this memorial looking for the (Vietnam) "Wall" and the infamous list of names. Once you point them in the right direction, many will not pause long enough to realize that the Korean War Veterans Memorial has a profound message for them as well. If you can draw them into a program or a discussion, you can take pride in your work as you educate the public on this obscure, neglected, sad, but heroic chapter in our American legacy. On good days, you will meet veterans of the era who will inspire and enlighten you as no research book or documentary can.

Flaring from the embers of World War II, waged in a faraway land, and concluded not with the enemy's surrender but with a bitter, negotiated armistice, the Korean War gave most Americans little to remember and much to forget. But for the 1.5 million U.S. men and women who served there and the families and friends of those who did not return, the Korean War could never be “The Forgotten War” it has been called all too often.

Fifty years after the cease-fire, there is renewed interest in this conflict that helped determine the course of the Cold War. Recent re-examinations of this conflict have generated a new appreciation for the contributions of those who left home and homeland to aid in the struggle against blatant Communist aggression. The Korean War Veterans Memorial honors the men and women who served in Korea for their struggles and sacrifices under trying circumstances. Their service to their country and to the causes of freedom and self-government has finally been recognized at the national level.

In the early morning hours of June 25, 1950, the Communist government of North Korea launched an attack into South Korea. And so it began. Not even five years after the end of World War II, our war-weary country found itself again embroiled in a major international conflict.

Determined to restore the status-quo in the region and check Communist gains, the United States led a United Nations force to the remote Asian peninsula. What U.S. leaders envisioned as a short, decisive victory became a prolonged, bitter, and frustrating fight that threatened to explode beyond Korean borders. For three years the fighting raged and troops advanced and retreated until an uneasy truce returned to the region. After all the battles and all the casualties, the negotiated settlement roughly re-established the pre-war boundary between North and South Korea. To many, the war seemed a defeat, a stalemate, or at least not a victory. But today, we realize our troops accomplished the political objective-- **South Korea remains free.**

For a "police action" that is all but forgotten, it raged on a grand scale. One and a half million American men and women of all races struggled side by side during the conflict. They served as soldiers, marines, seamen, airmen, chaplains, nurses, clerks, and in other combat and support positions. One hundred thirty-one service-members were awarded the Medal of Honor for their sacrifices in the Korean conflict. Ninety-four of them bought that honor with their lives.



**Daily and Standing Operating Procedures for Duty at the Korean War Veterans Memorial.** As with the other sites, Rangers will open and close the Ranger / Information kiosk. This building is alarmed, so you must disarm the device upon entry and re-arm it at the close of the evening. You will have to perform other routine tasks: inspect the memorial, restock brochures and maps, make official logbook entries, periodically conduct visitation (Denver) counts, post appropriate signs, provide formal interpretive talks per the published schedule, and open or close the gates which protect the “Honor Roll” computer screens.

**Special Equipment, Video Equipment and Computers.** This site has special computers, touch-screens and a printer associated with the “Honor Roll” database. This system allows visitors to find and print information on service-members killed or missing as a result of the Korean War. Follow the operating instructions posted in the kiosk. Most importantly, do not close the door to the printer as it overheats and stops working. In the event the printer has a paper jam, attempt to clear the jam and restart the printer. Similarly, if the touch-screens or CPUs freeze up and stop responding, follow the procedures listed in the kiosk. If you cannot get the printer, CPU, or touch-screens to work, notify your Supervisory Ranger at Survey Lodge and request they call a technician.

**Alarms.** See your Lead Ranger for the entry/ departure security codes to disarm and arm the device. Follow the directions on the LED read-out on the alarm panel.

Twenty Most Frequently Asked Questions.

1. What Memorial is this? This is the Korean War Veterans Memorial.
2. **Where are the bathrooms?** The nearest bathrooms are in the lower lobby of the Lincoln Memorial. There are also bathrooms just past the U.S. Park Police horse stables, south of the Reflecting Pool, half way between here and 17th Street.
3. **Where is the nearest pay phone?** There are several public phones just to the west of the memorial entrance, along French Drive, by the refreshment trailer.
4. **Where can I get a taxi?** There is a taxi stand along French Drive by the refreshment trailer.
5. **Where can I get food/ drinks?** There is a refreshment trailer along French Drive. The closest restaurants would be up 23rd Street, in a little shopping center just past Virginia Avenue, or at 21st Street and I Street to the north.
6. **Where is the nearest water fountain?** There is one by the Information/ Ranger kiosk in our memorial, or there are fountains in the Lincoln Memorial.
7. **Where is the FDR Memorial?** To reach the FDR Memorial, cross Independence Avenue and go around the Polo Field. If you walk to the Tidal Basin first, turn right along the sidewalk at the water’s edge. If you go along Ohio Drive or the Potomac River, turn left on West Basin Drive. It is a ten minute walk, about one-half mile.
8. **Where is the Vietnam Veterans Memorial or “The Wall”?** The memorial for those veterans is just across the Reflecting Pool, on the north side of the water.
9. **What are the statues made of?** Artist Frank Gaylord had these statues cast in stainless steel by Tallix Foundries, NY.
10. **How were the photos on the wall done?** The artist Louis Nelson and associates used a copyrighted technique that combines computer-generated stencils and sandblasting to create the mural we see along the granite wall.
11. **What are the (granite) slabs in the field?** Because architecture is art, people see different things in these rows of stone. Perhaps the architect placed these in the design to remind us of the obstacles posed by the rugged Korean terrain. Others see these as representative of irrigation ditches in rice paddies, again an accurate depiction of parts of the Korean countryside.
12. **Where are the names?** This memorial does not carry the names of Korean War victims. There is a computerized database at the kiosk which provides printouts of those killed and missing in Korea, but the wall with the names on it is the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, across the Reflecting Pool. Here, we can study the faces of these statues and perhaps see a bit of the sacrifice, weariness, and individualism of each service-member who died or went missing in Korea.
13. **When was this built?** Groundbreaking took place on Flag Day, June 14th, 1992. It was dedicated on July 27th, 1995, the 42nd anniversary of the armistice that ended the fighting.
14. **What are the countries listed on this wall?** Those are the names of the 22 countries that constituted the United Nations team that fought to repel the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces in this war. Five of those countries did not commit troops, but provided medical aid.
15. **Can I throw coins in the fountain?** Please do not. These men and women deserve your respect, not your pocket change.
16. **Are the statues based on real people?** Yes, many of the statues are based on characters from World War II, the sculptor’s war. Others depict figures from the Korean War. (See page 10 of this section for more information.)
17. **Who designed the memorial?** Unlike other memorials, there was no single designer. The basic design was proposed by a team of architects calling themselves “BL3” from State College, Pennsylvania (Penn State). Their winning design was altered and completed by architect of record Cooper-Lecky Architects.
18. **Who did the statues?** Artist and WW II 17th Airborne Division veteran Frank Gaylord, of Barre, Vermont.
19. **Will they ever put the names of the war-dead on the wall?** No, the memorial is complete. The enabling legislation called for this to be a “unique” concept. Obviously, the team of winning artists and the subsequent architect of record did not want to simply copy the Vietnam Veterans Memorial motif.
20. **How much did it cost to make?** The final cost was $18 million, raised through private donations. Initially, some federal “seed money” was used, serving much like a loan.

Description of the Cultural Resource.

# Origins of the Memorial. Our country was slow to honor our Korean War veterans. It was not until the nation witnessed the healing phenomena occurring at the Vietnam Veterans memorial that the plight of the Korean War veterans was re-considered. It was not until October 28, 1986, that Congress authorized the American Battle Monuments Commission to establish a memorial in Washington, D.C., to honor members of the U.S. armed forces who served in the Korean War.

# The first ideas for the tribute to the veterans of the Korean War. The Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory Board was appointed by President Ronald Reagan to recommend a site and design, and to raise construction funds. The board developed a concept for the memorial:

The Korean War Veterans Memorial has two interrelated purposes which constitute primary considerations for its design and siting.

The first—and fundamental—purpose is to express the enduring gratitude of the American people for all who took part in that conflict under our flag, those who survived no less than those who gave their lives.

The second—and of equal importance—is to project, in most positive fashion, the spirit of service, the willingness to sacrifice, and the dedication to the cause of freedom that characterized all participants…

Both purposes dictate that the Memorial be unique in concept, designed for public use, located on a prominent prospect, and present a renewable aspect of hope, honor, and service.

**Congressional Resolutions.** On October 28th, 1986, the 99th Congress passed Public Law 99-572 which authorized the American Battle Monuments Commission to establish a memorial on federal land in the District of Columbia, established the 12-member advisory board, and authorized the use of $1 million federal funds to be applied against design and construction costs.

Public Law 100-267 authorized the use of a 2.2 acre site in Ash Woods, just southeast of the Lincoln Memorial.

Public Law 101-495 authorized the U.S. Mint to issue up to one million Korean War Commemorative, legal tender, silver dollars with the surcharges to go to the Korean War Veterans Fund for construction costs.

**Design Competition and Design Approval.** The design for this memorial was to be the product of an open design competition, announced September 26, 1988. The members of the advisory board served as the official judges for the design competition. Five non-voting professional consultants, including architects and artists, assisted the board members. The board selected 1st 2nd and 3rd place winners on June 1, 1989. The winning design had been submitted by Veronica Burns-Lucas, Don Leon, John Lucas, and Eliza Oberholtzer-Pennypacker from State College, Pennsylvania (Penn State).

Although the American Battle Monuments Commission approved of the winning design, when it went before other authorities like the National Capital Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts, it ran into trouble. The following text from The History of Fine Arts Commission describes some of the controversies that surrounded the winning design:

*In July 1989, the Commission of Fine Arts saw the winning entry and listened to General Richard Stilwell (USA Ret.), chairman of the (Korean War Veterans Memorial Advisory) Board, discuss the statement of concept that had been given to all of the competitors. The major points were that the Korean War had been waged in the cause of freedom, and unlike the Vietnam War, there had been a victory in geo-political terms. Although the memorial would be American, it would pay homage to all those who had participated, including those from the United Nations forces.*

*Ms. Lucas explained the design concept to the members. She said the site would complete the cruciform plan of memorials on the Mall, complementing the Vietnam Memorial on the other side of the Lincoln Memorial/Washington Monument axis. She explained that as one approached the site, the figures of thirty-eight statues of marching foot soldiers, over seven feet tall, would be seen in the distance, recalling the repetitive image of long lines of men moving across the Korean landscape during the war.*

*At the memorial entrance, the visitors would begin the walk along an ascending ramp, about 300 feet long, flanked by soldiers, seemingly marching through “a landscape symbolic of war”. This effect will be achieved by setting the statues in rushing water, flanked on either side by fields of barberry bushes, with plane trees pruned in torturous shapes defining the memorial area on the Mall.*

*At the top of the ramp, pools of still water, signifying the end of the war, would be followed by a shorter ramp descending to a paved plaza with the American flag on axis and the Washington Monument in the distance. Looking back, the visitor would see a wall with inscriptions and sketches recalling the various activities associated with combat, depictions of the country and people of Korea, and a reminder that 21 (other) nations had participated in the conflict. At one end of the wall an alcove would commemorate the dead and missing, and those who were prisoners of war.*

*The emphasis in this part of the memorial would be on the end of the struggle and the prospect for peace. The landscape would change accordingly, with the dogwood trees defining the Mall boundary, and arborvitae and stone seating bench edging the arc-shaped walk at the southern boundary of the memorial which would take the visitor back to the entrance.*

*The (CFA) members congratulated the design team on the sensitive way in which the concept had been handled, and then discussed the questions they had, as well as others that had been raised by the Park Service and the Memorial Advisory Commission.*

*Some of the questions were technical - how to keep moss and algae from growing in the water, where to place the circulating pumps, and how to maintain the thorny barberry and pruned plane trees. Others were concerned with elements of design - how to enforce the one-way traffic circulation, how to keep the memorial from being too walled off from the rest of the Mall, and how to soften the plaza area, which, with its great amount of granite paving, seemed unnecessarily harsh.*

*Elements of the landscaping were also questioned, especially the dogwood, because of a blight that was spreading rapidly in the Washington area, and an arborvitae, because it looked too stiff; holly was suggested instead. Questions were asked also about the sculpture - the advisability and even possibility of one person doing all thirty-eight statues. At the end of the discussion, it was agreed that the concept could be approved, but there were many details of the design that needed more study.*

*In December of 1990 the (CFA) saw a revised design. In the intervening time, the Korean War Memorial Advisory Board had hired an architectural firm, Cooper-Lecky Associates, to produce the working drawings and supervise construction of the memorial, making any necessary adjustments to the design as the details were developed. The firm had performed a similar function for the Vietnam memorial. A sculptor, Frank Gaylord, had also been selected, and by late 1990 had already produced clay maquettes of thirty-eight soldiers. It was agreed that the sculpture material would be aluminum or white bronze, rather than granite, because of the ease of working in metal and the ability to produce more detail.*

*When the (CFA) members first saw the revised design, they were surprised at how much it had changed. The line of figures no longer ran parallel to the reflecting pool, but on a diagonal, making a visual connection between the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. The line terminated at a flag plaza, then a curved wall angled off toward a reflecting pool; on the wall would be inscriptions and pictorial recognition of the various support troops. The visitors then enter a comparative grove, where the dead and missing are honored, before leaving the memorial on the Mall path system.*

*The fields of barberry, tortured trees and the arc of arborvitae screening the figures from Independence Ave. had been eliminated. The landscaping was softer, more in keeping with Constitution Gardens on the other side of the Reflecting Pool, and berming and trees were used to screen the soldiers from the avenue.*

*Architect Kent Cooper said he had not intended to alter the original design to this extent when he began trying to address the concerns of the various reviewing agencies and the Korean War Memorial Board, whose members had been very pleased with the concept of the line of soldiers, but less enthusiastic about other aspects of the competition winning scheme. He said it was when he started working with the circulation problem that the design really began to change. It was noted that the landscape architect firm that had won the competition had declined to work with Mr. Cooper in making changes to their design.*

*Representatives from this firm then asked to present their response to criticisms made by the Commission at the July 1989 meeting. They stated first that they considered Mr. Cooper’s design a totally new concept, dramatically opposed to theirs. The Commission listened to their presentation, but confined their discussion primarily to Mr. Cooper’s revised design, which was what had been submitted to them by the American Battle Monuments Commission, an agency responsible for erecting the memorial.*

The members agreed that there were now two designs for the Memorial, not one that had been revised. And they agreed that they both had the same problem - too many elements. The new scheme, in fact, seemed to be three separate memorials; in dealing with the problems of circulation and the walling off of the memorial from the Mall, it had lost the sense of focus and unity seen in the original design, and it had made the memorial, with its thirty-eight sculptured figures, visible from all over that part of the Mall. The chairman observed that the great success of the Vietnam Memorial was that it had not disturbed the existing Mall elements.

The portrayal of the thirty-eight soldiers also worried the members. They were impressed by the photography of the clay maquettes that Mr. Gaylord presented, but concerned that they would become too realistic as they were developed. Instead of the line of semi-abstract stone figures, moving from war to peace, seen in the original design, these soldiers were seen to be on a mission, encountering enemy fire, and they were portrayed in a great variety of poses.

*The (CFA) Chairman told General Stilwell that it was clear the commission was not ready to take any action, that there was not enough design information on which to base a decision.*

Eventually, the original team of architects who won the competition for the memorial design dropped by the wayside. In order to regain control of their design, they attempted to sue the federal government, but lost. At that point, the architectural firm of record, Cooper-Lecky Associates became the principle design team.

# The Final Design. The numerous commissions continued to balk at elements of the design. Finally, on March 5th, 1992, the National Capital Planning Commission issued its final approval and the process moved forward.

# On June 14, 1992, President Bush led the groundbreaking by turning the first shovel of dirt. The architectural firm explained its vision for the memorial as “The Visitor Experience” in the Ground Breaking ceremonial program:


# *Continuing down a gentle slope, through dense plantings, the visitor to the Memorial suddenly arrives at the base of a triangular, open field which slopes upward towards an American flag at the far apex.*

# *Two columns of battle clad ground troops are advancing up the slope. Made of light colored metal, the wind at their backs, these figures seem propelled with ever increasing intensity towards a destiny beyond the flag which they serve. They remind us of the steadfast courage in the face of extreme danger so often required in the Korean conflict.*

At the south edge of the clearing is a polished granite memorial wall etched with hundreds of faces of those who supported the troops: the Airmen, Nurses, Chaplains, Artillerymen, Sailors, Tank Drivers, Supply Personnel, and others. All seem to look out intently at the poignant scene.

As the visitor moves upward beside the columns of troops, a circle of linden trees, located just beyond the flag, comes into view. Passing the last figure, the visitor enters this quiet grove with a still pool at its center.

The pool is ringed with benches where the visitor may pause to reflect on both the bravery of these men and women and the tragic loss.



When the visitor is ready to leave the pool area, a pathway leads back down the slope, along the Memorial wall. As the visitor descends, the etched faces of the support forces mix with those of the ground troops, who are now reflected in the polished granite. These intermingled images graphically symbolize the unity of all who served.

# Artwork , Architecture, and Inscriptions of the Memorial. The memorial environment is a harmonious blend of four distinct elements: the “United Nations Wall”, the “Field of Service”, the “Pool of Remembrance” and the “Wall of Faces”.

**The “United Nations Wall”.** Visitors approaching the memorial come first to a granite curb on the north side of the statues. This low wall lists the 22 countries that battled the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces or gave medical support to the UN effort. Visitors are sometimes surprised to learn that the conflict involved other allied countries, a coalition of forces opposed to the spread of Communism and launched by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

These nations sent air, naval, and ground troops to stem the advance of the aggressors. Nearly 150,000 foreign service members joined American troops on the Korean peninsula. Over 3,300 of them died in the effort, and over 1,800 are still not accounted for.

They were often alongside America's troops, facing the same obstacles, and encountering the same difficulties. Imagine defending this ridge held by the Colombian Battalion.



**The United Nations Team During The Korean War (As they appear on the UN wall of the Memorial):**

**<TBODY>Australia:** Two Infantry Battalions, Naval Forces, One Fighter Squadron



**Belgium:** One Infantry Battalion

**Canada:** Reinforced Infantry Brigade, Naval Forces, One Squadron of Transport Aircraft



**Columbia:** One Infantry Battalion, One Naval Frigate </TBODY>



**Denmark: Medical** (Red Cross)</TBODY>



**Ethiopia:** One Infantry Battalion



**France:** One Reinforced Infantry Battalion



**Greece:** One Infantry Battalion, Transport Aircraft </TBODY>



**India: Medical** </TBODY> (Army)



**Italy: Medical** (Red Cross) </TBODY>



**Luxembourg:** One Infantry Company



**Netherlands:** One Infantry Battalion, Naval Forces



**New Zealand:** One Artillery Regiment




**Norway: Medical** (Army) </TBODY>



### **Philippines:** One Infantry Battalion, One Tank Company </TBODY>



**Republic of Korea,** Numerous



**South Africa:** One Fighter Squadron



**Sweden: Medical** (Red Cross) </TBODY>



Thailand: One Infantry Regiment, Naval Forces, Air and Naval Transports



**Turkey:** One Fighting Infantry Brigade



**United Kingdom:** Two Infantry Brigades, One Armor Regiment, Three Artillery and Combat Engineer Regiments, The Far Eastern Fleet, Two Sunderland Squadrons

**United States,** Numerous




**The “Field of Service”.** Adjacent to the UN wall is a triangular "field of service." Here 19 stainless steel statues, the creation of World War II veteran Frank Gaylord, depict a patrol and evoke the experience of American ground troops in Korea.



Granite strips and scrubby juniper bushes suggest the rugged Korean terrain and vegetation, while windblown ponchos recall the harsh weather that tormented our troops and added to their misery. This symbolic patrol brings together members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines and portrays servicemen from a variety of ethnic backgrounds.

**Models for the statues.** Artist Gaylord says he intended to represent many nationalities in the sculptures, but since he was from Vermont, he had few non-Caucasian models with which to work. He did use several of his World War II comrades-in-arms as models, often working from their high school photos to recapture their youthful images. Some of the statues are based on men who fought in Korea. A few are anonymous.



**Statue #1:** This is the pointman, an Army Lead Scout, Caucasian, carrying an M1 Garand. Based on Korean veteran, John Triano, the sculptor’s son’s Father-in-law.

**Statue #2:** Army, Scout, Caucasian, carrying the M1 Garand rifle.

**Statue #3:** Army, Squad Leader, Caucasian, carrying an M1 Garand rifle. Based on Chip Wood, brother-in-law of Erdman, model for statue 19. Wood served 2 years in Korea.

**Statue #4:** Army, Automatic Rifleman, African-American, equipped with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).

**Statue #5:** Army Assistant Automatic Rifleman, Caucasian, carrying an M1 Carbine. This is a self-portrait of Frank Gaylord, Sculptor and WWII veteran of Company C, 513th Infantry.

**Statue #6:** Army, Rifleman, African-American, with the M1 Garand rifle.

**Statue #7:** Army, Patrol Leader, Caucasian, carrying an M1 Carbine. Based upon Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, Gaylord’s Company Commander during WW II. Kendrick also served in Korea, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic.

**Statue #8:** Army, Radio Operator, Caucasian, M1 Carbine. Based on Obel Wells, no further information.

**Statue #9:** Army, Medic, Hispanic, who is not armed. Based on Joseph Vitale, WW II veteran of Company C, 513th Infantry.

**Statue #10:** Army, Forward Observer, Caucasian, M1 Carbine. Based on Army General Richard G. Stilwell, Korean War Veteran and later Commanding General of US Forces, Korea.

**Statue #11:** Air Force, Air-Ground Controller, armed with M1 Carbine.Based on Alan Noyes, no further information.


**Statue #12:** Marine Corps, Assistant Machine Gunner, Caucasian, .30 caliber machine gun tripod.Based on Adolph Martinez, WW II veteran of Co. C, 513th Infantry.

**Statue #13:** Marine Corps, Machine Gunner, Caucasian, .30 caliber machine gun. Based on James Smith, WW II veteran of Company C, 513th Infantry. The following is an excerpt from an article in The Washington Post: “Silver Star Presentation to James G. Smith”. *Smith was awarded the Silver Star at a* ***presentation at the Korean War Veterans Memorial on May 15,1999, for gallantry in Action on January 26, 1945 during WW II.***

# *Smith was brought to the site unaware of the honor he was to receive. Smith had carried a fellow serviceman, John Erdman to safety, after Erdman had been shot 5 times during the Battle of the Bulge. The Silver Star was presented by former Senator Bob Dole. Also in attendance was Col. “Butch” Kendrick, a company commander, as well as Frank Gaylord, another soldier and sculptor of the statues.*

**Statue #14:** Navy, Corpsman (medic), African-American, unarmed.

**Statue #15:** Army, Rifleman, Asian-American, M1 Garand.



Statue #16: Army, Rifleman, Caucasian, M1 Garand.

Field of Service

Statue #17: Army, Rifleman, Hispanic, M1 Garand.

**Statue #18:** Army, Assistant Patrol Leader, Caucasian, M1 Garand. This is the first soldier you see upon entering the memorial from the Lincoln Memorial path, adjacent to the UN wall. It is based on William (Bill) Weber, Colonel, US Army, Retired. That heroic officer lost an arm, leg and vision in one eye while in Korea, but went on to serve his country for nearly twenty more years.

**Statue #19:** Army, Rifleman, Native American, carrying an M1 Garand rifle. This statue is based on John Erdman, WW II veteran of Co. C, 513th Infantry. Mr. Erdman was wounded five times during the Battle of the Bulge, 1945.

The field of service culminates at the triangular dedication stone at the base of the flagpole. The words on that stone remind us of the selfless duty which our veterans performed:

OUR NATION HONORS HER SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO ANSWERED THE CALL TO DEFEND A COUNTRY THEY NEVER KNEW AND A PEOPLE THEY NEVER MET.



**The "Pool of Remembrance".**  At the end of the field of service, the point of the triangle enclosing the statues juts into a 128 foot diameter circular pool, just as the Korean Peninsula protrudes into the Korean Strait and the East China Sea. Water feeds into the pool from its bottom and it flows over a stepped weir to give a pleasant rippling sound. Surrounding the pool are 40 Linden trees which create a barrel effect, allowing the sun to reflect on the pool. Nine benches, located under the trees, provide a place for visitors to rest and reflect on the terrible price the youth of the warring nations paid during the war. A stone curb by the pool tells the awful story of the Korean War. Numbers of those killed, wounded, missing in action, and prisoners of war are etched into the curb at the water’s edge:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Dead** | **Missing** | **Captured** | **Wounded** |
| **U.S.** | **54,246** | **8,177** | **7,140** | **103,284** |
| **U.N.** | **628,833** | **470,267** | **92,970** | **1,064,453** |

As late as June, 2000, the Department of Defense was still clarifying the numbers used for these engravings. For more information, see pages 18-20 of this section.

Opposite this accounting of the war's cost rests the powerful inscription, inlaid in silver letters:

***Freedom is Not Free***

**Mural Wall, the “Wall of Faces”:** After a short gap, the California Academy black granite wall continues to the west, where visitors will encounter a grand martial mural. The granite is adorned with etchings of over 2,400 period photographs of Korean War service-members, obtained from the National Archives.  The mural represents those forces that augmented and supported the foot troops. The stone mural depicts Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel and their equipment.



As one examines the mural, there is a haunting reflection of the statues from the "Field of Service." The etched images are devoid of insignia or name tapes, making them representative of all who served.

These images reveal the determination of the U.S. forces and the countless ways in which Americans answered the call to duty.

The Mural Wall was designed by Louis Nelson Associates of New York, NY and fabricated by Cold Spring Granite Company, Cold Spring, MN.  The muralist, sculptor, and architect worked closely to create a two dimensional work of art that would compliment the statues and draw attention to the unity of effort demonstrated by all who served.

The muralist enhanced and manipulated the photographs with a computer to give them uniform lighting, size, and shadow effect. The etchings are arranged to rise and fall in harmony with the layout of the statues.

The mirror-like Academy Black Granite reflects the 19 images of the statues in the "Field of Service" and creates an image of 38 statues, symbolic of the 38th Parallel.

When viewed from afar, the etchings also create the appearance of the rugged Korean mountain ranges.  The wall is organized by military branch and specialty fields as shown below:



**A section of the mural showing Engineers.**

Honor Roll: Our kiosk contains the Korean War Honor Roll, sponsored by the American Battle Monuments Commission. The Honor Roll database designed to include the names of all American military personnel who lost their lives or were reported missing in action, or lost or buried at sea throughout the world during the Korean War period (25 June, 1950 through 27 July, 1954, one year after the armistice).



However, the database also includes the names of those American service-members that have been killed in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) since the armistice. One of the most notorious of these incidents occurred in the DMZ in 1976. It involved the beating and murder of two American officers who were leading an effort to cut down a tree which blocked their ability to observe North Korea forces in the Joint Security Zone of the DMZ. You will find the names of Major Arthur Bonifas and 1LT Mark Barrett in this database, a clear reminder that this war did not really end in 1953.

The Korean Honor Roll database is incomplete due to a fire which destroyed the records of many of those who died in areas outside of Korea during the period in question. As of June, 2000, the database included 37,333 people whereas it should ultimately contain:

1. At least the names of 54,246 service-members killed throughout the world from 25 June, 1950-July 27, 1954.
2. Plus the number of those killed along the DMZ since 28 July, 1954.
3. Plus the numbers of those officially accounted for as "Missing in Action", a number which is still steeped in great confusion.

Upon demand, the computer can print a color certificate bearing an individual's name, service, rank, service number, date of birth, hometown or county of entry into the service, cause of death, date of death and, if the information is furnished to ABMC, the serviceman's unit, awards, circumstances surrounding the death or missing in action and photograph. Visitors may send information and photographs to the ABMC about any service-member who was killed or listed missing during the war. You will find blank forms for this inside the kiosk. The database and information submission forms are also available to visitors on the web at www.abmc.gov.

# Memorial Statistics:

**Mural Wall:** 41 panels extending 164 feet.

**Stone:** California Granite

**Weight of Wall:** 100 tons

**Pool of Remembrance** **Diameter:** 128 feet.

**Weight of Dedication Stone:** 8 tons

**Cost:** $18 Million.

**Statue Height:** larger than life, 7’3”-7’6”.

# Statue Weight: 1,000 pounds

# The Dedication Ceremony. The memorial was dedicated on July 27, 1995, the 42nd anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War, by President William J. Clinton and Kim Young Sam, President of the Republic of Korea.

**The Legacy: Relevant Celebrations or Gatherings at the Site.** Countless ceremonies have taken place at the site since its dedication. Veterans Day, Memorial Day, Korean War Armistice Day (27 July) and the anniversary of the invasion (25 June) are the most likely days for big gatherings. You will see numerous officials and dignitaries from our own and foreign defense organizations perform small wreath laying ceremonies at other times, as well.

**Possible Universal Concepts and Themes for Rangers at the Korean War Veterans Memorial.** Of all the words spoken about the memorial, perhaps the most touching came from a veteran of that war:

*They went not for conquest and not for gain, but only to protect the anguished and the innocent. They suffered greatly and by their heroism in a thousand forgotten battles they added a luster to the codes we hold most dear: duty, honor, country, fidelity, bravery, integrity. . . .***--William Sessions, former FBI director and a veteran of the Korean War**

All of those codes of which he spoke can become universal concepts for an interpretive program at the Korean War Veterans Memorial:

• Duty: Discuss these veterans who quietly went to war and just as quietly came home.

• Honor: Describe the honors won by units and individuals, like Medal of Honor recipients.

• Country: Talk about the sovereignty of nations…how our country honors these warriors and the country that remains free today because of the war. Also, consider how the Chinese feared encroachment upon their country's border and how that brought them into the fray. Contrast it with the oppressive, suffering regime in North Korea.

• Fidelity: Talk about comrades that faithfully come here to pay their respects to fallen friends.

• Bravery: Focus on the small party that made up Task Force Smith and how they tried to hold off the North Korean advance with outdated weapons, no support, and little hope. The poncho-clad statues can support your theme, as many TF Smith members wore ponchos the morning they were attacked.

• Integrity: Describe how American prisoners of war were bound and shot, and how their comrades still lived by the moral values of the Geneva Convention.

• Sacrifice: Describe the losses--the cost of this war--why isn't freedom free? Use the stories of some of the men behind the statues or Medal of Honor recipients.

• Freedom: Talk about how America and the United Nations countries battled communism so that South Koreans might remain free to elect their leaders.

• Equality: Discuss how America had recently integrated its armed forces in 1948, how Korea tested this principle, and how individual minority soldiers fought and died alongside white soldiers from the same unit. What happened when these men who were equals in war returned to a society without equal rights? Did their experiences hasten the civil rights movement?

• Perseverance: Lead a discussion of the ebb-and-flow of battle from the early rout of America's meager forces to the current day stand for freedom. Or talk about men who endured heartbreaking casualties at Pork Chop Hill, only to evacuate the ground they had defended.

• Vainglory: Did MacArthur’s thirst for victory and vindication lead a fighting force to the brink of disaster and a President to relieve him?

**Reinforce Your Theme with the Story of a Medal of Honor Recipient.**

**Barber, William E.**

Rank and organization: Captain U.S. Marine Corps, commanding officer, Company F, 2d Battalion 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein.). Place and date: Chosin Reservoir area, Korea, 28 November to 2 December 1950.Entered service at: West Liberty, Ky. Born: 30 November 1919, Dehart, Ky. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of Company F in action against enemy aggressor forces. Assigned to defend a 3-mile mountain pass along the division's main supply line and commanding the only route of approach in the march from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, Capt. Barber took position with his battle-weary troops and, before nightfall, had dug in and set up a defense along the frozen, snow-covered hillside. When a force of estimated regimental strength savagely attacked during the night, inflicting heavy casualties and finally surrounding his position following a bitterly fought 7-hour conflict, Capt. Barber, after repulsing the enemy gave assurance that he could hold if supplied by airdrops and requested permission to stand fast when orders were received by radio to fight his way back to a relieving force after 2 reinforcing units had been driven back under fierce resistance in their attempts to reach the isolated troops. Aware that leaving the position would sever contact with the 8,000 marines trapped at Yudam-ni and jeopardize their chances of joining the 3,000 more awaiting their arrival in Hagaru-ri for the continued drive to the sea, he chose to risk loss of his command rather than sacrifice more men if the enemy seized control and forced a renewed battle to regain the position, or abandon his many wounded who were unable to walk. Although severely wounded in the leg in the early morning of the 29th, Capt. Barber continued to maintain personal control, often moving up and down the lines on a stretcher to direct the defense and consistently encouraging and inspiring his men to supreme efforts despite the staggering opposition. Waging desperate battle throughout 5 days and 6 nights of repeated onslaughts launched by the fanatical aggressors, he and his heroic command accounted for approximately1,000 enemy dead in this epic stand in bitter subzero weather, and when the company was relieved only 82 of his original 220 men were able to walk away from the position so valiantly defended against insuperable odds. His profound faith and courage, great personal valor, and unwavering fortitude were decisive factors in the successful withdrawal of the division from the deathtrap in the Chosin Reservoir sector and reflect the highest credit upon Capt. Barber, his intrepid officers and men, and the U.S. Naval Service.

**Red Cloud, Mitchell, Jr.**

Rank and organization: Corporal, U S. Army, Company E, 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. Place and date: Near Chonghyon, Korea,5 November 1950. Entered service at: Merrilan Wis. Born: 2 July 1924, Hatfield, Wis. G.O. No.: 26, 25 April 1951. Citation: Cpl. Red Cloud, Company E, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against the enemy. From his position on the point of a ridge immediately in front of the company command post he was the first to detect the approach of the Chinese Communist forces and give the alarm as the enemy charged from a brush-covered area less than 100 feet from him. Springing up he delivered devastating point blank automatic rifle fire into the advancing enemy. His accurate and intense fire checked this assault and gained time for the company to consolidate its defense. With utter fearlessness he maintained his firing position until severely wounded by enemy fire. Refusing assistance he pulled himself to his feet and wrapping his arm around a tree continued his deadly fire again, until he was fatally wounded. This heroic act stopped the enemy from overrunning his company's position and gained time for reorganization and evacuation of the wounded. Cpl. Red Cloud's dauntless courage and gallant self-sacrifice reflects the highest credit upon himself and upholds the esteemed traditions of the U.S. Army.

**Hammond, Francis C.**

Rank and organization: Hospital Corpsman, U.S. Navy, attached as a medical corpsman to 1st Marine Division. Place and date: Korea, 26-27 March 1953.Entered service at: Alexandria, Va. Birth: Alexandria, Va. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a HC serving with the 1st Marine Division inaction against enemy aggressor forces on the night of 26-27 March 1953.After reaching an intermediate objective during a counterattack against a heavily entrenched and numerically superior hostile force occupying ground on a bitterly contested outpost far in advance of the main line of resistance. HC Hammond's platoon was subjected to a murderous barrage of hostile mortar and artillery fire, followed by a vicious assault by onrushing enemy troops. Resolutely advancing through the veritable curtain of fire to aid his stricken comrades, HC Hammond moved among the stalwart garrison of marines and, although critically wounded himself, valiantly continued to administer aid to the other wounded throughout an exhausting 4-hour period. When the unit was ordered to withdraw, he skillfully directed the evacuation of casualties and remained in the fire-swept area to assist the corpsmen of the relieving unit until he was struck by a round of enemy mortar fire and fell, mortally wounded. By his exceptional fortitude, inspiring initiative and self-sacrificing efforts, HC Hammond undoubtedly saved the lives of many marines. His great personal valor in the face of overwhelming odds enhances and sustains the finest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country.

**Statistics on the Korean War.**

**A Statistical Sketch of American Veterans, Korean War: June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **U.S. Personnel Who Served in Korea During the War** | **1,500,000+** |
| **U.S. Personnel Stationed in Far East Command**  (Korea, Japan,Okinawa, Sea of Japan) | **1,789,000+** |
| **U.S. Active Duty Personnel Worldwide During War** | **5,764,143+** |
|  |  |
| **In-theater U.S. Battle Deaths During War** | **33,686\*** |
| **In-theater U.S. "Non-Battle " Deaths During War** | **2,830\*** |
| **Total In-theater U.S. Deaths During War** | **36,516\*** |
|  |  |
| **U.S. Wounded in Action (hospitalized)** | **103,284+** |
|  |  |
| **U.S. Prisoners of War Who were Returned Alive** | **4,418+** |
| **U.S. Prisoners of War Who Died in Captivity** | **2,701+** |
| **U.S. Prisoners of War Who Refused Repatriation** | **21+** |
| **Total U.S. Service-members Taken Prisoner of War** | **7,140+** |
|  |  |
| **U.S. Personnel Missing , Korea** | **8,206¹** |
|  |  |
| **Total Medal of Honor Recipients** | **131+** |
| **Posthumous Medal of Honor Recipients** | **94+** |

Notes:

+ Information derived from American Battle Monuments Commission.

\*Information derived from Chief Historian, Department of Defense Korean War Commemoration Committee.

**¹**According to Information from Defense POW/ Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) Pentagon, as of 20 June, 2000, the figure for "Personnel Missing, Korea" (PMKOR). Of the total still missing:

4,262 were MIAs (of which 4,237 are believed dead pursuant to Presumptive Findings of Death)

2,053 POWs determined to have died in captivity

1,798 KIAs

93 Non-Battle Dead

8,206 Total Personnel Missing, Korea

These numbers are the result of recent attempts to reconcile competing "official" statistical lists. To create PMKOR, DPMO consolidated and verified information available in the Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii computerized database; the Washington Headquarters Service's Directorate for Information Operations and Reports list; and the American Battle Monuments Commission list of Americans unaccounted for from the Korean War. To improve accuracy, the military services reviewed their respective sections.

One of these reports is the probable source of the figure of "8,177 MIAs" that was inscribed at the Korean War Veterans Memorial in 1995. This is extremely misleading, as this number likely included known KIAs and Non-Combat Dead. It is more appropriate to think of this as the 1954 "best guess" on "Bodies Not Recovered" statistic.

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DPMO has made extensive efforts to ensure the accuracy of all the information in PMKOR. Some records, however, are more than 40 years old and are sometimes unclear. Archival research efforts continue worldwide to obtain additional information concerning the fate of those Americans from the Korean War whose remains have not been recovered or accounted-for.

Casualty Statistics in the Memorial. In June, 2000, the Department of Defense revealed data that caused visitors to question the veracity of the numbers inscribed on the Pool of Remembrance wall at the memorial. Most visitors tend to compare the number of deaths from the Korean War to the number of names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial wall. There appears to be some sort of judgement made about each generation of warrior based upon how many men gave their lives.

In light of the newly clarified data, Rangers should be prepared to answer some tough questions about the number of deaths in Korea. Understand that this is a sensitive issue, as Korean War veterans took great pride in the old numbers because it "proved" they had suffered as much as the celebrated Vietnam veterans. Now, with smaller numbers, they may perceive the country is once again attempting to reduce them to second class warriors, a perception which would only open old wounds for these forgotten, then remembered, then discounted heroes.

Make no mistake--these veterans suffered and we should find a way to make visitors understand the ferocity of that war and the degree of suffering our troops endured. It is helpful to remind visitors that the Vietnam wall is a movie of 19 years of conflict…the Korean War is a snapshot of a three year moment.

If the deaths were spread evenly across each day of each war, 30 men would have died each day in Korea, compared to 8 each day in Vietnam. Clearly, there was a different intensity and brutality to each war. In his book The Korean War, Max Hastings quotes one veteran from both wars as saying, "In Korea, there was nothing to do but fight."

*<!-- title -->Korean War Death Stats Highlight Modern DoD Safety Record,<!-- /title --> <!-- TexT --><!-- header1 -->By Staff Sgt. Kathleen T. Rhem, USA <!-- /header1 --><!-- header2 -->American Forces Press Service <!-- /header2 -->*

*WASHINGTON, June 8, 2000 -- A recent clarification by Pentagon officials about Korean War deaths spotlighted just how far DoD has come in providing a safe atmosphere for U.S. service members.*

*Historians have said for a generation that 54,246 service members died during the Korean War. Most Americans assumed that's how many died in combat in Korea. Not true, DoD officials said this week. The death toll from 1950 to 1953, the time period encompassing the Korean War, is correct. But that figure includes all service members who died on active duty for any reason, not just those killed in battle.*

DoD changed its reporting procedures in 1993 and divided the total into 33,686 battle deaths, 2,830 nonbattle deaths in Korea, and 17,730 other deaths DoD-wide, said Pentagon spokesman Rear Adm. Craig Quigley in a press briefing June 6. The breakdown isn't new, but with the 50th anniversary of the Korean War raising the issue in the national consciousness, Pentagon officials thought it prudent to clarify the numbers.

**DoD News Briefing, Tuesday, June 06, 2000 - 1:30 p.m. EDT, Presenter:** Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, DASD PA

*Q: Can I just go back to the Korean War for a moment? Can you just, for the record, just clarify what the current estimate of Americans killed in the Korean conflict is, and how it should be adjusted?*

*Rear Adm. Quigley: Yeah, I sure can. The overall number has remained constant. What has changed is the reporting methodology in those numbers. Let me just run through the numbers specifically. We're talking about the period of time from 1950 to 1953 and the number of deaths within the Korean theater of operations, okay? So that's the boundaries that we're putting in place here, okay?*

*We have changed our reporting procedures over time, and I took a look at three snapshots -- in 1974, in 1997, and now in 2000. You'll see one significant change, which I will describe here in more detail just in a moment, but other than that, the overall numbers have changed only slightly, as you would expect -- as remains are recovered, rumors are changed to fact -- and so you're talking about pluses or minuses of a handful; 10, 12. Other than that shift, on those three periods of time the numbers have remained about the same.*

*But in 1974, these were the categories of people: battle deaths, other deaths, and then a total for those two categories.*

*The number of 54,246 has not changed. And today I would still tell you that it's 54,246 that have died, but the difference being as follows:*

*We then started breaking them out in 1993 by battle deaths, non-battle deaths still in Korea, and then other, like a training accident in California, or a soldier killed in an automobile accident in Germany or Italy or some other place around the world, but not in Korea. And that is the methodology and the computing practice that we follow today.*

*So today the numbers are as follows, okay? Battle deaths in Korea: 33,686. Non-battle deaths in Korea: 2,830. Other military deaths around the world, not in Korea: 17,730. And again, for a total of 54,246. So the difference is in the methodology of the computation and how we count those numbers.*

*Q: Isn't that a fairly large number -- 17,000 deaths over three years -- for non-combat? I mean, that's half what you've got from a very violent, vigorous war going on. I mean, are the --*

*Rear Adm. Quigley: Jim, you're used to the figures that we have been enjoying in recent years, with the emphasis that all the services have placed on safety, training safety, attention to detail around the world and throughout each of the services. If you take a look at that time in history, in the early 1950s, the services simply did not have that focus that we have in recent years on trying the absolute best that we can to keep training deaths, other causes -- now a person in uniform who dies in a car accident completely off base is also counted in that as well.*

*So I can't break down for you the 17,730 number with any specificity, without doing a little bit more digging. But I would just say that we have made incredible strides in reducing the number of non-combat accidental deaths, training deaths, and things of that sort in recent years.*

*Q: Craig, that's close to about two a day for three years. That just seems hard to believe.*

*Rear Adm. Quigley: I did not do the math, but I won't question theirs.*

Obviously, this matter is not cleared up.

**United Nations Casualties and Troop Strength, Korean War.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Combat Deaths** | **Wounded** | **MIA** | **Captured** | **Total Casualties** | **Total Personnel Who Served** | **Peak Troop Strength (JUL 53)** |
| **Australia** | 339 | 1,216 | 72 | 21 | 1,648 | 17,164 | 2,282 |
| **Belgium** | 101 | 336 | 5 | 1 | 443 | 3,498 | 900 |
| **Canada** | 312 | 1,212 | 32 | 2 | 1,558 | 27,000 | 6,146 |
| **Columbia** | 163 | 448 | 28 | 29 | 668 | 6,200 | 1,068 |
| **Ethiopia** | 121 | 536 | 0 | 0 | 657 | 3,518 | 1,271 |
| **France** | 262 | 1,008 | 19 | 11 | 1,300 | 4,000 | 1,119 |
| **Greece** | 192 | 543 | 2 | 1 | 738 | 5,000 | 1,263 |
| **Luxembourg** | 2 | 13 | 0 |  | 15 | 89 | 44 |
| **Netherlands** | 120 | 645 | 3 | 0 | 768 | 5,300 | 819 |
| **New Zealand** | 23 | 79 | 1 | 1 | 104 | 4,500 | 1,389 |
| **Philippines** | 122 | 299 | 57 | 40 | 518 | 7,420 | 1,496 |
| **South Africa** | 34 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 48 | 811 | 826 |
| **Thailand** | 129 | 1,139 | 5 | 0 | 1,273 | 6,500 | 1,294 |
| **Turkey** | 741 | 2,068 | 407 | 217 | 3,433 | 15,000 | 5,455 |
| **UK** | 746 | 2,533 | 1,157 | 766 | 5,202 | 60,000 | 14,198 |
| **Total** | **3,407** | **12,075** | **1,796** | **1,095** | **18,373** | **166,000** |  |

# Information taken from ABMC and Department of Defense Korean War Commemoration Committee statistics.

# Overview of The Korean War:



**Storm over the Peninsula**

# The following is taken from Encyclopedia Britannica:

The conflict that began in June 1950 between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), in which an estimated 3,000,000 persons lost their lives. The [United Nations](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50396,00.html), with the [United States](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50397,00.html) as the principal participant, joined the war on the side of the South Koreans, and the People's Republic of [China](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50398,00.html) eventually came to North Korea's aid. After exceptional vicissitudes, the war was ended inconclusively in July 1953; it established a precedent for United States intervention to contain Communist expansion.

At the end of World War II, the Allies agreed that Soviet forces would accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea north of the [38th](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50399,00.html) degree of latitude, while American troops would accept the Japanese surrender south of that line. In 1947, after the failure of negotiations to achieve the unification of the two separate Korean states that had thus been created, the United States turned the issue over to the United Nations.



The Soviet Union refused to cooperate with UN plans to hold general elections in the two Koreas, and as a result, a Communist state was permanently established under Soviet auspices in the north and a pro-Western state was set up in the south. By 1949 both the United States and the Soviet Union had withdrawn the majority of their troops from the Korean Peninsula.

On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans, with the tacit approval of the Soviet Union, unleashed a carefully planned attack southward across the 38th parallel. The United Nations Security Council met in emergency session and passed a resolution calling for the assistance of all UN members in halting the North Korean invasion. (The Soviet delegate, who was absent from the Security Council in protest against the UN's failure to admit the People's Republic of China, was not present to veto the council's decision.)

On June 27, U.S. president [Harry S. Truman](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50401,00.html), without asking Congress to declare war, ordered United States forces to come to the assistance of South Korea as part of the UN "police action."

Meanwhile, the South Korean army was overwhelmed by the North Korean forces, and the four ill-equipped American divisions that had been rushed into the battle were driven all the way southward across the Korean Peninsula to a small area covering the approaches to Pusan, on the peninsula's southeastern tip.

The American forces there were heavily reinforced, however, and then on September 15, troops commanded by General [Douglas MacArthur](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50402,00.html) made a daring amphibious landing at [Inch'on](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50403,00.html) (*see* <ART id=21651>photograph</ART>), about 100 miles (160 km) below the 38th parallel and on a line with Seoul, the South Korean capital. This brilliant landing far north of the main battlefront succeeded in cutting the North Korean forces' lines; the North Korean army was then totally shattered by the convergence of Allied forces from north and south, and more than 125,000 prisoners were captured by the Allies.



As the Allied forces now advanced northward back to the 38th parallel, the Chinese warned that the presence of UN forces in North Korea would be unacceptable to the security of the Chinese People's Republic and would force the Chinese to intervene in the war. UN forces, however, ignored the warnings and advanced into North Korea with the expressed intention of unifying the country. By mid-November the Allied forces were nearing the Yalu River, which marked the border between North Korea and Manchuria, the northeast part of China. The Chinese considered the approach of UN forces to the Yalu to be an unacceptable threat to Manchuria. On November 24 MacArthur announced his "Home by Christmas" offensive, in which his forces would boldly advance right up to the Yalu.

The next day approximately 180,000 Chinese "volunteers" entered the war, and by December 15, after bitter winter fighting and a harrowing retreat, the Allied troops had been driven southward back to the 38th parallel. On Dec. 31, 1950, the Communists began their second invasion of South Korea with about 500,000 troops, but their attack soon faltered in the face of incessant Allied aerial bombing campaigns, and the front lines eventually stabilized along the 38th parallel.

Meanwhile, MacArthur was demanding the authority to blockade China's coastline and bomb its Manchurian bases. Truman refused, feeling that such a course would bring the Soviet Union into the war and thus lead to a global conflict. In response, MacArthur appealed over Truman's head directly to the American public in an effort to enlist support for his war aims.

On April 11, 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur as UN commander and as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East and replaced him with General Matthew B. Ridgway. On July 10, 1951, truce talks began while the North Koreans and Chinese vainly strove for further success on the battlefield. The negotiations dragged on for months, until after the U.S. presidential elections in the fall of 1952 and the victory of Dwight D. [Eisenhower](http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/idxref/7/0,5716,50404,00.html), who had criticized the unpopular war and announced his intention to visit Korea if elected.

Eisenhower secretly informed the North Koreans and Chinese that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons and would also carry the war to China if a peace agreement was not reached. After a brief renewal of hostilities in June 1953, an armistice was concluded on July 27, and the front line was accepted as the de facto boundary between North and South Korea. The exchange and repatriation of prisoners soon followed.

The Korean War resulted in the deaths of about 1,300,000 South Koreans, many of whom were civilians; 1,000,000 Chinese; 500,000 North Koreans; and about 54,000 Americans, with much smaller numbers of British, Australian, and Turkish casualties on the Allied side. Several million Koreans temporarily became refugees, and much of South Korea's industrial plant was damaged, while North Korea was utterly devastated by American bombing campaigns.**Military Operations in Korea.**

**US Army.**

**(from DoD Korean War Commemoration Committee Web Site)**

**Outbreak of the War**

The Korean War began with a surprise attack June 25, 1950, when eight divisions and an armored brigade (90,000 soldiers) of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) attacked in three columns across the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK). Many of the NKPA were battle-tested, having served in the Chinese and Soviet armies in World War II. The 98,000-strong ROK Army (ROKA), its combat training incomplete, and having no tanks and only 89 howitzers, was no match for the better-equipped NKPA. Aided only by a 500-man U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group, the ROKA was overwhelmed. Spearheaded by tanks, NKPA forces moved rapidly through the Uijongbu Gap on the west side of the Korean peninsula and captured Seoul, South Korea's capital.

The ROKA fled south in disarray across the Han River toward Pusan, a major port at the southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula.

On June 25, the U.N. Security Council denounced North Korea's actions and called for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the NKPA to the 38th parallel. President Harry S. Truman directed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, whose Far East Command (FEC) was located in Tokyo, to evacuate American dependents from Korea and send ammunition to the beleaguered ROKA. The following day, Truman sanctioned the use of American air and naval forces below the 38th parallel. The next day, as the situation worsened, the United Nations requested its members to furnish military assistance to repel the invasion. Truman then extended American air and naval actions to North Korea and authorized the use of U.S. Army troops to protect Pusan. MacArthur, however, recommended committing a U.S. Army regiment in the Seoul area. Truman agreed, and on June 30 he told MacArthur to use all forces available to him.

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**South to the Naktong**

Ground forces most readily available to MacArthur included the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, all under the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) headquartered in Japan; the 29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in Okinawa, Japan; and the 5th RCT from Hawaii. But these units were hard pressed to defend the ROK because they were undermanned and their mobility and firepower had been reduced by shortages of organic units and equipment.

In an effort to delay the NKPA advance, MacArthur ordered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division moved to a defensive position astride the main road near Osan, 10 miles below Suwon. Named Task Force (TF) Smith after the battalion commander, this 540-man command lacked effective anti-tank weapons and was ill-prepared to stop the NKPA. Outflanked by an NKPA division and suffering some 200 casualties and the loss of all equipment, TF Smith broke into a disorganized retreat.

Meanwhile, at the United Nation's request, the United States formed the United Nations Command (UNC), which would integrate all American and allied forces. General MacArthur became its commander. He assigned command of ground forces in the Korea to Eighth U.S. Army under Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker. At the request of ROK President Syngman Rhee, Walker also assumed command of the ROK Army.

By the beginning of August, after the arrival of the 29th RCT from Okinawa on July 26,

Eighth U.S. Army held only a small portion of southeastern Korea. Walker ordered a stand along a 140-mile line arching from the Korea Strait to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) west and north of Pusan. Known as the "Pusan Perimeter," American divisions occupied the western segment, basing their position along the Naktong River; the ROK Army defended the northern segment. With Pusan secure, additional troops and equipment began arriving to reinforce EUSA's perilously long, thin defensive line. At the same time the arrival of the U.S. Army's 5th RCT from Hawaii, the 2d Infantry Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the United States, and a British infantry brigade, strengthened EUSA.

**Inchon**

Having traded space for time, MacArthur saw that the deeper the NKPA drove south, the more vulnerable it became to an amphibious envelopment. The amphibious force consisted of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, its ranks fleshed out with several thousand Korean recruits. MacArthur's decision to land at Inchon was a dangerous but remarkably bold and successful gamble. Tidal conditions allowed only a small window of opportunity for the landing. Moreover, he would be committing his last major reserves at a time when no more general reserve units were available in the United States.

Following the successful, lightly opposed landings at Inchon on Sept. 15, arduous street-to-street combat took place to liberate Seoul. On Sept. 29, the capital city was returned to President Rhee. Although many communist guerillas would remain behind, the NKPA virtually disintegrated and ceased to be an effective fighting force.

**North to the Yalu**

Truman authorized MacArthur to send his forces north of the 38th parallel on Sept. 27, provided there was no indication that major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) would enter the war. The U.N. General Assembly approved the UNC's entry into North Korea 10 days later, when it called for the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea. American and ROK Army forces rapidly advanced northward.

Warnings of Chinese intervention increased as the UNC pressed deeper into North Korea. At a Wake Island meeting on Oct. 15, Truman directed MacArthur to continue his advance if he believed UNC forces had a reasonable chance of success. Hoping to end operations before the onset of winter, MacArthur ordered all ground forces to advance to the northern border as rapidly as possible.

**The New War**

Beginning on Oct. 25, UNC forces met stout resistance almost everywhere across their front. On November 1, the 1st Cavalry Division's 8th Cavalry Regiment fought fierce battles with the CCF. Severe fighting continued Nov. 5–6, after which the CCF abruptly halted its activities in all sectors, leaving the UNC uncertain as to whether the CCF's actions had been merely defensive.

Tenth Corps, reinforced by the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and EUSA slowly renewed their offensive. Thinning logistical lines of support, inadequate intelligence and sub-zero cold added to the difficulties of the UNC. With the 7th Division leading, X Corps reached the Yalu at the town of Hyesanjin. Eighth Army units began moving forward from the Chongchon on Nov. 24, and were hit hard by strong CCF attacks. On Nov. 27, the attacks engulfed the leftmost forces of the X Corps at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, and by Nov. 28th, UNC positions began to crumble. MacArthur informed Washington that the UNC faced an entirely new war. With more than 300,000 Chinese in North Korea, he directed Walker to withdraw to escape envelopment by the CCF. MacArthur ordered X Corps to fall back to a beachhead around the port of Hungnam.

Unrelenting CCF pressure, which often included surprise nighttime assaults and hand-to-hand combat and the rigors of a harsh winter, made the UNC's retreat dangerous and costly. The 2d Division, covering the withdrawal of I Corps and the ROK II Corps from the Chongchon, encountered an entrenched CCF force below the town of Kunu-ri. The CCF surrounded and severely punished the 2d Division as the unit fought its way through the gauntlet to escape.

**Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir**

Abandoning Pyongyang on Dec. 5, elements of EUSA reached the 38th parallel 10 days later, where it prepared to protect Seoul and develop a coast-to-coast defense. Tenth Corps fought a 13-day running battle to the east coast as it withdrew to Hungnam. Near the Changjin Reservoir, the 1st Marine Division and elements of the U.S. 7th Division met stiff opposition from the CCF in positions overlooking the mountain road to the sea. The 3d Division, positioned near Hungnam with X Corps, was sent inland to open the road and protect the withdrawal of the Army and Marine Corps units. On Dec. 11, X Corps completed its move to Hungnam, and American and ROK Army forces began their evacuation to Pusan the same day. Tenth Corps, which became part of EUSA, completed the evacuation Christmas Eve.

**A Change in Leadership**

CCF attacks and successive withdrawals had weakened EUSA, and General Walker's accidental death on Dec. 23, was another dispiriting blow. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, who arrived from Washington, D.C., on Dec. 26, took command of EUSA. Despite Ridgway's hurried efforts to brace the defensive line across the peninsula, he and his men could not contain the CCF's New Year's offensive. Seoul fell in early January 1951. Ridgway pulled EUSA's entire front below the 38th parallel. When the CCF offensive faltered in mid-January, Ridgway was ready to resume the offensive and adopted a strategy to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy with minimum losses to his troops. Ridgway proposed a war of maneuver, slashing the enemy as it withdrew and fighting delaying actions when the enemy attacked. Land gains became less important than damaging the CCF/NKPA and keeping the enemy off balance.

Ridgway's offensive began on Jan. 25, advancing slowly and methodically, ridge by ridge, phase line by phase line, wiping out each pocket of resistance before moving farther north. Operations THUNDERBOLT, KILLER, RIPPER and RUGGED carried the U.N. forces forward. EUSA liberated Seoul in mid-March and neared the 38th parallel. For the next month, EUSA cautiously probed north of the parallel, expanding the front first to phase Line KANSAS, 10 miles above the 38th, and then to the Iron Triangle, an enemy logistical area north of Line KANSAS.

Ridgway's ground strategy proved apt for the new, more limited objectives that American and U.N. officials adopted of clearing the CCF/NKPA from South Korea and opening negotiations with the enemy. Because of differences regarding war strategy and goals, Truman relieved MacArthur as United Nations Forces commander on April 11, and replaced him with Ridgway. On April 14, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet succeeded Ridgway as head of EUSA.

Eight days after Van Fleet assumed command, the enemy began its spring offensive. The major CCF and NKPA attack was directed at Seoul. The I Corps contained the enemy's advance. EUSA halted the attack on May 20, after the enemy had penetrated 30 miles. Seeking to preclude another enemy attack, Van Fleet ordered EUSA forward. By the end of May, EUSA had progressed to a position just short of Line KANSAS, having virtually cleared the ROK of enemy troops. Van Fleet moved next to reach Line WYOMING, which would give EUSA control of the lower portion of the Iron Triangle. When the Soviet Union's delegate to the United Nations proposed a cease-fire in Korea on June 23, EUSA occupied Line KANSAS and the Wyoming Bulge, ground suitable for a strong defense.

**The Static War**

As the fighting lapsed into patrolling and small local clashes, armistice negotiations began on July 10, 1951, at Kaesong. The opposing delegations agreed that hostilities would continue until an armistice was signed. Except for brief episodes, action along the front for the next two years never regained the momentum of the first year. On Nov. 17, the two delegations agreed that a line of demarcation during the armistice would be the existing line of contact provided an agreement was reached in 30 days. On Nov. 12, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive operations. Fighting tapered off to patrol clashes, raids and small battles for possession of outposts in no-man's land.

The battlefield stalemate was periodically interrupted by artillery duels, ambushes, raids and costly small-scale hill battles such as Old Baldy. The battlefield lull enabled the Army to return the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions to Japan and to replace them with the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, two of the eight Army National Guard divisions that were mobilized during the war. A new United Nations Forces commander, General Mark W. Clark, replaced Ridgway in May 1952, and Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor replaced Van Fleet as EUSA commander in February 1953.

As armistice negotiations entered their final and decisive phase in May, the enemy stepped up combat action. CCF forces launched regimental attacks against EUSA outposts in the west. In July, the enemy sought to wrest more ground from the UNC by driving a wedge eight miles deep into EUSA's central sector. Taylor quickly contained the enemy and counterattacked, but with an armistice agreement imminent, EUSA halted its attack on July 20 short of the original line. Finally, on July 27, 1953, the Armistice was signed and all fighting stopped.

After 37 months of combat, total UNC casualties reached more than 550,000, including 95,000 dead. American losses included 33,686 killed and 103,284 wounded. United States Army casualties alone totaled 27,728 dead and 77,596 wounded. The bulk of these casualties occurred during the first year of fighting. The estimate of enemy casualties, including prisoners, exceeded 1,500,000 of whom 900,000 were Chinese.

The Army deployed eight divisions to Korea--the 1st Cavalry Division; the 2d, 3d, 7th, 24th, 25th, 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions; and the 5th, 29th and 187th RCTs. U.S. Army personnel received 78 of the 131 Medals of Honor awarded to military members who served in Korea.

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# The Navy.

The U.S. Navy's primary role at the outset of the Korean War was to help the United Nations Command (UNC) avert a disaster in the Far East. The mobility of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the forward basing of its major combat element, the Seventh Fleet, allowed President Harry S. Truman to support his decision to oppose what he saw as a communist challenge in Asia. Soon after the North Korean invasion, he announced that the United States, as part of a U.N. coalition, would use military force to preserve the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

Truman also made it clear that the use of Chinese communist forces, and by implication Soviet air and naval forces to broaden the war in Asia, would be challenged. During the first week of the war, Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier *USS Valley Forge* (CV-45), heavy cruiser *USS Rochester* (CA-124), eight destroyers and three submarines were especially busy. The fleet displayed its strength along the Chinese coast. *Valley Forge* air squadrons also bombed airfields and rail yards in Pyongyang, North Korea, then beyond the range of the U.S. Air Force planes in Japan. The North Korean capital was the nerve center of the enemy's military establishment.

With the recent release of documents from the archives in Moscow and Beijing, it is now clear that the Navy's rapid show of force deterred the Chinese communists from carrying out a long-planned amphibious assault on the island of Taiwan, which was held by anti-communist Chinese Nationalist forces. An invasion of Taiwan would have widened the conflict in the Far East.

Moreover, the quick deployment to the Far East of U.S. naval and land-based air forces influenced Soviet Premier Josef Stalin to withdraw an earlier pledge of Soviet air support for the North Korean attack.

Throughout the Korean War, U.S. Navy submarines and aircraft patrolled between the Soviet Union and the combat theater, not only to warn of surprise attacks, but to discourage such attacks. Other submarines and patrol planes, and periodically carrier task forces, operated off the long Chinese coast in a similar deterrence role.

**Maintaining Sea Superiority**

The object of the Navy's combat operations was to maintain superiority at sea and in Far Eastern skies. It was no coincidence that at no time during the war did the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union use the sea or the air above it to support communist forces on the Korean Peninsula. The fleet's presence in the Western Pacific and its quick move to Korean waters also helped MacArthur's Far East Command to slow down the enemy's 1950 ground offensive, hold a precarious beachhead on the peninsula and build up forces ashore for a counteroffensive.

One of the allies' first actions was to destroy North Korean naval vessels. The North Korean navy operated only 45 small vessels, but they were pressed into the enemy's initial assault primarily to transport supplies to forces advancing along both coasts. In the early hours of the attack, the enemy also used naval vessels in a bold, strategic attempt to seize Pusan by landing 600 troops near the port. Pusan was one of South Korea's largest ports, and its location in southeastern Korea across from logistic support bases in Japan also made it vital to the allied cause. A North Korean victory there could have doomed the allied effort to retain a toehold in South Korea. But those 600 enemy troops never landed: Enemy ships were sunk by American naval gunfire.

**The Tide of Battle Turns at Inchon**

The fleet's great mobility and control of the seas enabled General MacArthur and the U.N. Command to turn the tide of battle. In mid-September 1950, Commander Seventh Fleet and Commander Task Force 7 Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble led an armada of 230 amphibious and other ships in a surprise amphibious assault on the port of Inchon on Korea's west coast. Named Operation CHROMITE, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments of the 1st Marine Division spearheaded the attack. Enemy and allied leaders alike had doubted that a major amphibious operation could be successful at Inchon, where the high tide ranged between 23 and 35 feet. At low tide, attacking ships faced the risk of being stuck in the mud. Furthermore, two fortified islands blocked access to the port of Inchon. Following days of bombardment by carrier planes and shelling by cruisers, destroyers and other naval gunfire support ships, elements of the 5th Marines, part of X Corps, initiated the assault at 6:33 a.m., Sept. 15. By the early morning hours of Sept. 16, their objectives had been secured.

MacArthur hoped for another Inchon-like landing on the eastern coast of North Korea. What slowed the amphibious operation was the fleet's discovery of between 2,000 and 4,000 Soviet-supplied magnetic and contact mines blocking the approaches to the port at Wonsan. Several U.S. Navy minesweepers were sunk before the troops could land. The setback at Wonsan resulted from the Navy's prewar reductions in the mine warfare force, failure to provide adequate equipment and general inattention to mine warfare. Despite the difficulties at Wonsan, the Task Force 95 minesweeping force registered some successes, such as the loss-free opening of the sea channel to Chinnampo, the port serving captured Pyongyang.

In November 1950, the Communist Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the war to assist the North Korean Army. The X Corps found itself outnumbered and dangerously overextended in the heart of North Korea. The allied command decided that X Corps, comprised of the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions, and three South Korean divisions of the I and II Corps would be evacuated by sea from the eastern ports of Hungnam and Wonsan.

**Naval Support at Chosin**

The withdrawal operation began on Dec. 10, 1950, when Task Force 90 embarked elements of the 1st Marine Division, which had just finished an arduous, masterful fighting withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir. Fleet carriers *Philippine Sea* (CV-47), *Valley Forge* (CV-45), *Princeton* (CV-37) and *Leyte Gulf* (CV-32) and three escort carriers had provided the American ground troops with crucial close-air support. Navy and Marine Corps aviators carried out more than 1,700 sorties during only one week of the operation. At the same time, the battleship *Missouri*, cruisers *St. Paul* (CA-73), and *Rochester* and a score of destroyers and rocket ships provided a ring of fire around the embarking allied troops. More than 23,000 16-inch, 8-inch, 5-inch and 3-inch rounds and rockets fell on Chinese and North Korean forces moving against the U.N. defensive perimeter. By Christmas Eve, when Navy explosive teams destroyed the port facilities at Hungnam, the Navy had withdrawn 105,000 troops, 91,000 civilian refugees, 350,000 tons of cargo and 17,500 military vehicles. Another 3,600 troops, 1,300 tons of cargo and 196 vehicles had been airlifted out by Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft. Clearly, the Navy's control of the sea enabled the X Corps to live to fight another day.

**Blockading the Coastlines**

The navies of the U.N. coalition also maintained a blockade of North Korea's coastlines. This prevented the enemy from using the sea and also allowed allied vessels to move about in relative freedom. This strategic advantage also enabled U.N. Command surface ships and submarines to land U.S. Navy underwater demolition teams (UDTs), U.S. Marines, British Royal Marine commandos, South Korean commandos and other special forces on both Korean coasts and on many coastal islands. The elite units destroyed enemy railways and railway tunnels, highway bridges and supply depots. U.N. naval forces also landed Korean guerrillas ashore for long operations behind enemy lines. In a major effort from Feb. 16, 1951, to the end of the Korean War, the fleet prevented the enemy from using the port of Wonsan by subjecting it to bombardment by air units, battleships, cruisers and destroyers of Task Force 95. One history of the war also credits this operation with diverting 80,000 North Korean troops from frontline duty.

Sea control was especially important during the last two years of the war, when the enemy launched numerous ground operations whose objectives were to force the U.N. to withdraw its troops from Korea — the best-case scenario — or to improve their negotiating position in the cease-fire talks held at Panmunjom. Sea power was a major factor in frustrating these communist goals and persuading the enemy to sign the Armistice agreement ending the Korean War on July 27, 1953.

**Those Who Served**

More than 265,000 Navy personnel served in Korea during the war — a sizeable proportion of the 5,720,000 other Americans who answered the call to duty. Four hundred seventy-five Navy personnel were killed in action; another 4,043 sailors died from disease or injury; and 1,576 were wounded in action during this first major conflict of the Cold War era.

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# The Air Force.

# (from DoD Korean War Commemorative Committee web page.)

When North Korea invaded South Korea June 25, 1950, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) was less than three years old. Prior to September 1947, the USAF was the U.S. Army Air Forces. Thus the Korean War was its first conflict—a tough, grueling conflict—as an independent service.

Part of the occupation forces in Japan, the organization responsible for the aerial defense of that country was the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), commanded by Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF consisted of three air forces scattered across the western Pacific, the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Twentieth. It was Maj. Gen. Earle E. "Pat" Partridge's Fifth Air Force in Japan that would bear the brunt of the Korean fighting. Like the other services, FEAF suffered from severe post-World War II cutbacks in budget, equipment, and personnel. Nonetheless, FEAF was ready for action when the war erupted.

The first USAF plane destroyed in the war was a disabled C-54 transport caught by enemy fighters at Seoul's Kimpo Airfield. Some 1,465 additional USAF planes would be lost to various causes before the conflict ended. Only 10 percent of these losses would be in air-to-air combat. FEAF's initial actions of the war were defensive, primarily protecting transport aircraft and ships carrying civilians evacuating Korea. On June 27, while performing such cover missions, F-82 Twin Mustang all-weather interceptors shot down three YAK fighters attempting to interfere with the evacuations. A few hours later, four more enemy planes fell to F-80 jet fighters. These seven planes were the first of more than 975 enemy aircraft to be downed by FEAF planes in aerial combat.

By mid-July FEAF obtained not just air superiority but air supremacy wherein the opposing air force was incapable of effective interference. Such supremacy did not last, however. In November 1950, it appeared that the war might be over soon. Triumphant U.N. units had driven the retreating North Koreans before them and were now approaching the Yalu River and the Manchurian border. Suddenly, overwhelming numbers of Chinese Communist troops entered the battle and drove the U.N. forces back south of the 38th Parallel. Entering the fray at the same time was the MiG-15 jet fighter. With the appearance of this new and very dangerous adversary, the air war entered a new phase.

On November 8, 1950, 1st Lt. Russell Brown, flying an F-80, shot down a MiG-15 in the first all-jet dogfight in history. It was apparent, however, that the MiG-15 was superior to any aircraft then in FEAF's inventory. The MiG's pilots were also very good, being (for the most part) veteran Russian fliers. But FEAF soon had a counter to the MiG-15—the superb F-86A (and later, F-86E/F) Sabre. Many of the Sabre pilots were veterans of World War II and their expertise showed. Soon the Sabres and MiGs were mixing it up over northwest Korea, an area that became known as "MiG Alley." On December 17, 1950, Lt. Col. Bruce Hinton WAS THE FIRST Sabre pilot to score the first of an estimated 818 MiG-15 kills.

While the war turned into a stalemate on the ground, MiG Alley remained a hot spot throughout the war. For a time the B-29s continued bombing targets in northwest Korea by day, but when MiG-15s shot down five Superfortresses in a week in October 1951, the big bombers began attacking only at night. Day after day, though, the Sabres (joined by F-84 Thunderjets or F-80s) swept into MiG Alley to meet the MiG-15s rising from their fields in Manchuria. Although the U.S. government directed that these fields were "off limits" to the FEAF aircraft, some of these planes occasionally strayed across the border in "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft.

For the last two years of the war ground fighting was occasionally heavy and bloody and ground was lost and regained by both sides. The front line (which eventually ran from just south of the 38th Parallel on the west coast, along a line northeast to above the Parallel on the east coast) remained relatively static. FEAF aircraft continued to bomb bridges, warehouses, railroads, and other targets in North Korea in an effort to end the stalemate. Three interdiction operations, two named STRANGLE and another called SATURATE, tried to paralyze the enemy's transportation system upon which he relied for supplies. Weather and an inability to execute sustained night attacks thwarted these efforts.

Much more successful was FEAF's campaign to employ air power to pressure the Chinese into accepting an Armistice satisfactory to the United States. This "air pressure" campaign was perhaps a key factor in finally ending the war. Attacks, in June 1952, on four hydroelectric generating complexes at Suiho, Chosin, Fusen, and Kyosen opened the campaign. These raids were spectacularly successful; North Korea experienced a nearly total loss of electric power for two weeks and never regained its former level of generating capacity before the end of the war. Manchuria, too, suffered the loss of a quarter of its supply of electricity.

These onslaughts, though very damaging and painful, still did not bring the Communists to the Armistice table, but even more harrowing onslaughts were forthcoming. These took the form of attacks on North Korea's irrigation dams, which in essence hit the enemy in the breadbasket. In May 1953, FEAF planes shattered three of North Korea's 20 irrigation dams. The resulting floods wiped out roads, railroad tracks, and thousands of acres of rice fields. Even though the enemy soon repaired the damage, they had to reduce the water levels in all the dams so as to prevent flooding in case of attack. These precautions, however, also reduced the water available to the remaining rice crops.

The war dragged on for two more months and then, on July 27, 1953, it was over as the Armistice was at last signed. For FEAF the war ended in a flurry of action. In these last months the MiGs appeared in greater numbers than ever. In one furious battle on June 30, 16 MiGs fell to Sabre guns — the most ever in a single air combat action involving the F-86 jet aircraft.

A statistical summary reveals the magnitude and ferocity of the Korean air war. FEAF grew from a force of 33,625 personnel in June 1950, to nearly 112,200 officers and airmen in July 1953. In the summer of 1950, FEAF controlled just 16 groups, 44 squadrons, and 657 aircraft. At its highest point, in the summer of 1952, FEAF controlled 20 groups, 70 squadrons, and 1,441 aircraft.

During the war, FEAF units flew 720,980 sorties and delivered 476,000 tons of ordnance. For these numbers FEAF estimated it had killed nearly 150,000 North Korean and Chinese troops and claimed the destruction of more than 975 aircraft, 800 bridges, 1,100 tanks, 800 locomotives, 9,000 railroad cars, 70,000 motor vehicles, and 80,000 buildings. This damage was inflicted at the cost of 1,841 men killed, wounded and missing, and 750 aircraft destroyed by the enemy. Four USAF fliers were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in the war. The furious air battles in the North Korean skies also resulted in 38 USAF pilots scoring five or more victories to become aces. Leading the way was Capt. Joseph C. McConnell Jr., with 16 MiGs to his credit.

No one service can claim to have single-handedly won the war. But each contributed immeasurably to the effort, and the Air Force was no exception. The brave men and women who served in the FEAF answered their country's call to defend freedom in a far away land. Many paid with their lives, and all who served deserve this nation's gratitude. The men and women of FEAF know first hand that Freedom is not Free.

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# The USMC.

# (from DoD Korean War Commemorative Committee web page.)

On June 25, 1950, eight divisions of the North Korean People's Army, equipped with Soviet tanks, mobile artillery and supporting aircraft, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea. On June 27, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council proclaimed the North Korean attack a breach of world peace and requested member nations to assist the Republic of Korea.

On June 30, President Harry S. Truman ordered a naval blockade of the Korean coast and authorized the Commander in Chief Far East, General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, to send U.S. ground troops into Korea. On July 2, MacArthur recommended that a Marine Corps regimental combat team be deployed to the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his request the following day.

On July 7, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. The core of the ground element was the 5th Marines, while Marine Aircraft Group 33 made up the air element of the brigade. Just five days after its activation, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, with a strength of over 6,500, sailed from San Diego en route to Pusan, Korea.

The first elements of the brigade came ashore at Pusan on Aug. 2. The next day, the first Marine aviation mission against North Korea was flown from the *USS Sicily* (CVE-118) by gull-winged Corsairs of Marine Corps Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214) in a raid against North Korean installations. They were subsequently joined by Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323), flying from the *USS Badoeng Strait* (CVE-116). The two squadrons harassed enemy positions and installations near the city of Seoul and close to both the 38th parallel and North Korean Army supply lines.

**The Landing at Inchon.** Final approval for the operation, code named CHROMITE, was not given until Sept. 8. On Sept. 15, the 1st Marine Division, under the command of Major General Oliver P. Smith, led the first major U.N. force strike in North Korean-occupied territory, with a surprise amphibious assault at Inchon.

The attacking force had to navigate a narrow channel with swift currents and horrendous tidal changes, while dodging islands and potential coastal defense battery sites. In five days of textbook-style campaigning, the division closed on the approaches of Seoul, the South Korean capital.

In house-to-house fighting, the Marines wrested the city from its communist captors by Sept. 27. On Oct. 7, 1950, with North Korean forces in full retreat, the Inchon-Seoul campaign was formally declared closed.

**Marines at the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir .** In late October, the 1st Marine Division landed at Wonsan and spread out to secure the approaches to the port city. The division was then ordered to advance northwest of Hungnam along a mountain road to the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir, the site of an important hydroelectric plant. The Marines would then advance to the Yalu River — the border between North Korea and the People's Republic of China.

Despite intelligence in early November that Chinese communist forces had massed on the Korean side of the Yalu, the 1st Marine Division was ordered to continue its progress northwest from Hungnam to the Chosin Reservoir. The brief autumn weather was almost over, and temperatures were turning bitterly cold. On Nov. 27, elements of the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army struck Marine positions in force. In a carefully-planned counterstroke, eight Chinese divisions charged down from surrounding mountains with the sole mission of destroying the 1st Marine Division.

Over the next four weeks, the Chinese and Marine Corps forces engaged in some of the fiercest fighting of the Korean War. In an epic movement, the 1st Marine Division completed a successful fighting withdrawal through 78 miles of mountain road in northeast Korea. The fighting withdrawal ended in mid-December with the amphibious evacuation of the Marines from the port of Hungnam, Korea. Although suffering more than 4,000 battle casualties and uncounted incidents of frostbite, Marine Corps air and ground units killed nearly 25,000 Chinese communist troops.

**After Chosin (Changjin).** During the first three months of 1951, the 1st Marine Division participated in several U.N. offensive operations, first against North Korean guerrillas and later participating in an advance through the mountains of east-central Korea. From late April to early July, the division took part in the U.N. defense against a Chinese communist spring offensive, in which U.N. forces faced nearly 500,000 enemy soldiers. The Chinese offensive ended in mid-May with heavy enemy losses.

The 1st Marine Division then participated in the U.S. Eighth Army drive northward past the eastern tip of the Hwachon Reservoir. By June 20, 1951, the division had taken its objective — a ridgeline overlooking a deep circular valley in the Korean mountains nicknamed the "Punchbowl." Truce negotiations soon began, and the U.N. forces settled down into a defensive line.

The winter of 1951–52 found the 1st Marine Division deployed along an 11-mile front just north of the Punchbowl. In mid-March, the division was reassigned from the X Corps' eastern position in Korea, to the I Corps area at the far western end of the U.N. line. On March 24, the division assumed responsibility for approximately 35 miles of the front, which overlooked Panmunjom and included the defense of the Pyongyang–Seoul corridor. The pace of the war now slowed, with small, localized actions replacing the earlier, large-scale offensives.

The relative quiet on the front was rudely shattered in late March 1953 when Chinese forces mounted a massive offensive across the U.N. front line that hit 1st Marine Division outposts in the right sector. On March 26, enemy forces attacked outposts "Reno," "Vegas" and "Carson" — the so-called Nevada Cities Campaign. All outposts were manned by the 5th Marines. In particularly bitter fighting, Outpost Reno fell to the enemy, but the stubborn 5th Marines maintained control of Vegas and Carson. Marine Corps casualties totaled more than 1,000, with communist losses at least twice as high.

During the first week of July, combat outposts Berlin and East Berlin in the 7th Marines right regimental sector came under attack during the Marines' relief of the U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division. The Marines did not concede any key terrain, and at 10 p.m. on July 27, 1953, the lengthy truce negotiated at Panmunjom finally went into effect, ending three years of fighting in Korea.

The price of liberty in human costs is always high, and the Korean War was no exception. Marine casualties totaled roughly 28,000; more than 4,200 Marines gave their lives in Korea. Forty-two Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor; 27 of these awards were posthumous. Additionally, 221 Navy Crosses and more than 1,500 Silver Stars were awarded to Marines.

**Marine Corps Aviation.** During the Korean War, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew more than 118,000 sorties in support of U.N. forces. Almost 40,000 of these sorties were close-air support missions. Marine helicopter squadrons evacuated more than 10,000 wounded personnel and greatly increased the survival rate for wounded Marines.

**Reserves.** In 1950, the Korean War saw the Marine Corps expand from 75,000 regulars to a peak strength of 261,000 Marines, most of whom were reservists. Complete mobilization of the organized ground Reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from July 20 to Sept. 11, 1950. Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951, the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent, and during the war, 48 percent of all 1st Marine Aircraft Wing combat sorties were flown by Marine reservists. Between July 1950 and June 1953, about 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.

**Growth of the Marine Corps During the Korean War.** The Marine Corps emerged from the Korean War with the highest sustained peacetime strength in its history. The suddenness of the war, and MacArthur's immediate request for Marines, had emphasized the importance of maintaining the Corps as a ready striking force.

The fiscal end strengths of the Marine Corps during the Korean War and immediate post-Armistice period were as follows:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Officers | Enlisted | Total |
| 1950 | 7,254 | 67,025 | 74,279 |
| 1951 | 15,150 | 177,770 | 192,920 |
| 1952 | 16,413 | 215,544 | 231,957 |
| 1953 | 18,731 | 230,488 | 249,219 |
| 1954 | 18,593 | 205,275 | 223,868 |

**Casualties.** The war in Korea was costly. The total U.S. casualties during the war numbered approximately 140,000 killed, missing in action and wounded. Marine Corps casualties from August 1950 to July 1953, were as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dead\* | Wounded | Total |
| 4,267 | 23,744 | 28,011 |

* *The total under "Dead" includes killed in action, died of wounds, captured and died, missing in action and presumed dead.*

For additional information contact:

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Building 58, Washington Navy Yard  
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or <http://www.usmc.mil>

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The sources used are located in the Reference Section of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.

**A March Toward Equality:** **Minorities in the Korean War.**

**African Americans.** (taken from the DoD Korean War Commemorative Committee web page)

African-Americans served in all combat and combat service elements during the Korean War and were involved in all major combat operations, including the advance of United Nations Forces to the Chinese border. In June 1950, almost 100,000 African-Americans were on active duty in the U.S. armed forces, equaling about 8 percent of total manpower. By the end of the war, probably more than 600,000 African-Americans had served in the military.

Changes in the United States, the growth of black political power and the U.S. Defense Department's realization that African-Americans were being underutilized because of racial prejudice led to new opportunities for African-Americans serving in the Korean War. In October 1951, the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment, a unit established in 1869, which had served during the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, was disbanded, essentially ending segregation in the U.S. Army. In the last two years of the Korean War throughout the services, hundreds of blacks held command positions, were posted to elite units such as combat aviation and served in a variety of technical military specialties. Additionally, more blacks than may have done so in a segregated military, chose to stay in the armed forces after the war because of the improved social environment, financial benefits, educational opportunities and promotion potential.

**Distinguished Service.** African-American servicemen distinguished themselves in combat during the ground battles with the North Korean Army and in the air war over Korea. On July 21, 1950, a battalion combat team commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Pierce Jr., composed of three infantry companies and an engineer company, recaptured Yech'on.

The action, which received national attention in the United States, was considered the first significant successful offensive operation by the U.S. Army in the war. Captain Charles Bussey, commander of the engineer company, was awarded the Silver Star for having prevented a flanking operation by a North Korean battalion during the battle. Bussey's platoon-size unit killed more than 250 enemy soldiers. Captain Bussey's bravery inspired his regiment and exemplified the preparedness and leadership capabilities of African-American soldiers.

**Heroes in the Air War.** In 1950, the Air Force had 25 black pilots in integrated fighter squadrons led by Captain Daniel "Chappie" James Jr., who was assigned to the 36th Squadron, 5th Air Force. Captain James was an exceptional fighter pilot who often flew his F-86 Sabre jet on dangerous, unarmed reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines -- a task reserved for a select group of the most able and trusted flyers. James flew 101 combat missions in Korea and earned the Distinguished Flying Cross before being reassigned stateside. In July 1951, he became the first African-American in the Air Force to command a fighter squadron.

Second Lieutenant Frank E. Peterson Jr., was the first black Marine Corps pilot. Peterson flew 64 combat missions before the war ended. He earned the Distinguished Flying Cross and six Air Medals in the final months of the Korean War.

Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the Navy's first African-American fighter pilot to die in combat, was shot down while providing close-air support for units of the 7th Marines during the Chosin Reservoir breakout in December 1950. Brown was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for performing dangerous combat actions that resulted in his fatal crash. In March 1972, Brown's widow christened a Knox-class ocean escort ship the *USS Jesse Brown*.

**African-Americans Who Gave Their Lives During the Korean War.** Of the more than 600,000 African-Americans who served in the armed forces during the Korean War, it is estimated that more than 5,000 died in combat. Because casualty records compiled by the services in the 1950s did not differentiate by race, the exact number of blacks killed in action cannot be determined.

Numerous African-Americans were awarded medals including the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star and Bronze Star for service during the Korean War. Two African-Americans, Private First Class William Thompson and Sergeant Cornelius Charlton were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Thompson was killed in action on Aug. 2, 1951, at a critical juncture in the 8th Army's attempt to stop the North Korean Army's southward movement. Charlton displayed extraordinary heroism in rallying his platoon to continue its assault on a hill near Chipo-ri, just north of the 38th parallel.

The Korean War changed the face of the American military. African-Americans served side by side in the same units with service members of all races and were afforded the opportunity to lead in combat.

**Coast Guard.** While Coast Guardsmen served in Korea and continued their duties worldwide throughout the war, it is interesting to note that in 1952, Coast Guard leadership recognized World War II Coast Guard steward Alex P. Haley for his unique writing talent and awarded him the rating of Journalist. Retired Chief Journalist Alex Haley became internationally known for his best-selling book, *Roots*.

In June 1950, almost 100,000 African-Americans were on active duty in the U.S. armed forces, equaling about 8 percent of total manpower. In the Army, 9.7 percent of active duty service members were black, including 72,000 enlisted men and approximately 1,200 officers. In the Air Force, 4.4 percent of active duty personnel were black, including 21,000 enlisted men and 300 officers. About 6,000 African-Americans, or about 3 percent of personnel, served in the Navy and Marine Corps. By the end of the war, probably more than 600,000 blacks had served in the armed forces.

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**Hispanics in Korea.**

(From DoD Korean War Commemorative Committee web page)

Hispanic-American ethnic groups, made up mostly of Puerto Ricans and others with ancestry from Mexico, Central and South America, Cuba and other Caribbean islands, already had distinguished themselves through combat skills and bravery during World War II.

In July 1950, there were about 20,000 Hispanics in the armed forces. Over the next three years, nearly 148,000 Hispanic-Americans volunteered for or were drafted into military service. Of these, approximately 60,000 Puerto Ricans served in Korea.

During the Korean War, most Hispanic-Americans served in the Army and Marine Corps. However, several thousand served in the Air Force, Navy and Coast Guard in both combat and combat service support branches. Commanders recognized the courage and determination of Hispanic-Americans in combat. Nine Hispanics were awarded the Medal of Honor and more than 100 others received Distinguished Service Crosses and Silver Stars for acts of combat bravery.

**Honor et Fidelitas.** Honor et Fidelitas, or "Honor and Loyalty," was the motto of the 65th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the United States territory of Puerto Rico. During the Korean War, this unit, nicknamed "The Borinqueneers" after one of the original Indian tribes inhabiting Puerto Rico, quickly won respect on the battlefield. The 65th deployed to Korea in September 1950, with 6,000 officers and men organized into three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion and a tank company. During October and November 1950, the 65th RCT participated in search-and-destroy missions targeting the remnants of North Korean Army units left in South Korea to harass U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.

In late November and early December, the unit, now attached to the Army's 3d Division, fought daily against units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. During Dec. 9–24, the 65th RCT joined the defensive perimeter protecting Hungnam Harbor during X Corps' withdrawal from North Korea.

During nine major campaigns over three years, the 65th RCT was credited with capturing 2,086 enemy soldiers and killing 5,905. The regiment received one Presidential Unit Citation (Army), one Presidential Unit Citation (Navy), one Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), one Navy Unit Commendation, two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations and the Bravery Gold Medal of Greece. Individual members of the unit were awarded four Distinguished Service Crosses and over 120 Silver Stars.

**Hispanics Who Received the Medal of Honor.** Nine Hispanic-Americans received the Medal of Honor during the Korean War. Private First Class Eugene A. Obregon, Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was killed on Sept. 26, 1950, in Seoul while trying to rescue a wounded Marine who was unable to return to safety. Private First Class Joseph C. Rodriguez, an infantry assistant squad leader in the Army's Company F, 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division assaulted several well-fortified enemy positions on a ridge near Munye-ri on May 21, 1951. Rodriguez killed 15 Chinese soldiers, enabling his company to take control of the hill.

On the night of May 31, 1951, near Wongtong-ni, Corporal Rodolfo P. Hernandez of the Army's Company G, 187th Airborne RCT protected his platoon from attacking Chinese troops by leaving his foxhole and engaging advancing enemy soldiers with only his rifle and bayonet. Hernandez killed six of the enemy before falling unconscious from grenade, bayonet and bullet wounds.

Private First Class Edward Gomez of Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was killed in action while attacking a heavily-fortified North Korean position, in a bloody, combat-scarred area known as the Punchbowl, on Sept. 14, 1951. Gomez exposed himself to hostile fire as his squad moved forward and threw himself upon an enemy grenade to protect other members of his unit. His sacrifice inspired Company E to continue the offensive and eventually gain control of Hill 749.

On Sept. 6, 1952, Corporal Benito Martinez's unit, Company A, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, was defending a hill known as the "Sandbag Castle" near Satae-ri when the North Koreans attacked. Martinez remained alone at a forward observation post. He held his position for six hours before running out of ammunition and being killed by the enemy.

Staff Sergeant Ambrosio Guillen of Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines defended an outpost near Panmunjom during the final days of the armistice negotiations. When two battalions of Chinese forces attacked Guillen's platoon the evening of July 25, 1953, his leadership inspired his fellow Marines to fight against a much larger enemy force and hold the position. The enemy retreated, but Sergeant Guillen later died of wounds he had received in hand-to-hand combat during this engagement. Two days later, on July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed at Panmunjom.

Three other Hispanic-Americans awarded the Medal of Honor were Captain Reginald B. Desiderio, commanding officer of the Army's Company E, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division; First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez, a platoon commander with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; and Private First Class Fernando Garcia, Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.

**Other Hispanic-Americans in the Korea War.** Many Hispanic-Americans who fought bravely during Korea went on to continued success in their military careers. Air Force Captain Manuel J. Fernandez Jr., a fighter ace of the 334th Squadron, 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, flew 125 combat missions over Korea. He shot down 14 MiG-15 fighter aircraft on his own and shared one additional shootdown. Captain Fernandez was awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross and a Silver Star during his tour of duty; he remained in the Air Force after the Korean War and retired with the rank of colonel.

Richard E. Cavazos received a battlefield commission as an Army second lieutenant in 1951 and retired in 1984 as a four-star general. He was a decorated platoon and company commander in the Korean War and served as a battalion commander in the Vietnam War.

Salvador E. Felices, a Puerto Rican who won a presidential appointment to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., in 1943, transferred to the Air Force when that service was established in 1947. During the Korean War, he served as combat operations officer for the 98th Bomber Wing based in Yokota, Japan, flying 19 combat missions in B-52s over Korea in 1953.

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**Women in Korea.**

(From DoD Korean War Commemorative Committee web page)

When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, women in the armed services numbered 22,000. Roughly 7,000 of these women were healthcare professionals, the rest served in line assignments in the Women's Army Corps (WAC); Women in the Air Force (WAF); Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, or Navy Women's Reserve (WAVES); and Women Marines. Although Congress had passed the Women's Armed Forces Integration Action in 1948 giving women increased prospects for military careers, the Department of Defense's efforts to recruit more women during the Korean War met with limited success and were discontinued in 1952. Individually, the WAC, WAVES, WAF and Women Marines each increased their strength during the war. However, the overall number of enlisted women in the services during the Korean War declined as a net percentage of Armed Forces personnel.

**Women's Army Corps.** With the onset of the Korean War, the need for more personnel from the Women's Army Corps increased quickly because Army leaders viewed these women as a means of releasing male soldiers for combat duty. To augment WAC numbers, the Army initiated voluntary and involuntary recalls for WAC reservists, began an ambitious recruiting campaign, and suspended the separation-on-marriage rule. The rule was reinstated for enlisted women and officers in July 1951 and October 1952, respectively. Nearly 1,600 members of the WAC, Army Nurse Corps and Women's Medical Specialist Corps, who were members of the Organized Reserve Corps (changed to U.S. Army Reserve in 1952), volunteered for active duty in the Army between July 1950 and June 1951. Fewer than 200 WACs were involuntarily recalled to active duty in 1951; this was the first time women were summoned to active duty without their consent.

Commanders in the Far East Command (FEC) and other overseas installations requested Women's Army Corps officers and enlisted women. These WACs worked in FEC Headquarters, other Tokyo and regional Japanese commands and station hospitals. In 1950, there were only 629 WACs in the FEC; one year later, that number increased to 2,600. WAC units in Japan, primarily hospital units, increased from two in 1950 to nine by 1953. A WAC unit in Okinawa, staffed by both medical and administrative personnel, was opened in 1951. Seven WACs served in Korea during 1952 and 1953; two were stenographers, four were interpreters and one was an aide-de-camp.

WAC personnel performed a wide range of occupational specialties, though they were prohibited from combat-related assignments. They served primarily in personnel and administration, communications, intelligence, medical, supply and food service units. WACs also had assignments as draftsman and censors and performed parachute rigging and weather observation duties.

The shortage of male soldiers in some overseas commands created more opportunities for women to serve in supervisory capacities and in some of the military occupational specialties traditionally reserved for men.

In the U.S. military hospitals in Japan, where many of the combat soldiers wounded in Korea were sent, WAC sergeants became ward masters. In other locations, women became senior noncommissioned officers holding jobs in motor pools, mess halls and post offices. WAC personnel in Japan also provided services outside their regular work assignments, donating blood for soldiers wounded in Korea and "adopting" fighting units — supplying them with stationery, food, books and knitting the men socks and sweaters.

**Army Nurse Corps.** When fighting began June 25, 1950, the Army Nurse Corps (ANC) had a total strength of about 3,450. One year later, the ANC's strength had grown to 5,397. Most of these nurses were World War II veterans who had joined the Reserves at the end of that war. During the war, approximately 540 nurses — all volunteers — served in Korea. When fighting began, Captain Viola B. McConnell, assigned to the U.S. Military Advisory Group in the Republic of Korea (ROK), was the only Army nurse on duty in Korea. For her work in assisting with the evacuation of about 700 Americans from Seoul, she was awarded the Bronze Star. McConnell also received the Oak Leaf Cluster (the equivalent of a second Bronze Star) in recognition of her outstanding service.

On July 5, 1950, four days after the first U.S. Army combat forces, Task Force Smith, arrived on the Korean Peninsula, 57 nurses arrived at Pusan, South Korea, from Japan to establish a U.S. Army hospital. The nurses helped set up the hospital and began caring for casualties the next day. Two days later, on July 8, 1950, 12 U.S. Army nurses moved forward with a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to Taejon on the front-line perimeter. By August, less than a month after the onset of hostilities, more than 100 Army nurses were on duty in South Korea in support of U.N. troops. The first Army nurses from the United States arrived on Aug.14.

Members of the ANC served throughout the Korean Peninsula. Army nurses supported combat troops defending the Pusan Perimeter, were present during the amphibious landing at Inchon and on the eastern coast of North Korea, and accompanied troops in the advance across the 38th parallel to the Yalu River on the Manchurian border. They also supported the U.N. Forces in their withdrawal south of the 38th parallel in the face of Chinese communist intervention.

The experience of 13 nurses who landed with the 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) shortly after the X Corps invasion of Inchon and Seoul on Sept. 15, 1950, provides a vivid example of the unique combat situations some Army nurses faced. These nurses took over the operation of an improvised civilian hospital in Inchon, living and working in the same primitive conditions as the GIs for whom they cared. These nurses wore fatigues, steel helmets and combat boots rather than their traditional uniforms. The nurses used their helmets as wash basins and carried and ate out of their aluminum mess kits. Like combat soldiers at the front, they lived in tents or shattered buildings and slept in sleeping bags.

Nurses from Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey also served in the Far East Command. Japanese nurses worked in hospitals in their homeland, and Korean nurses cared for members of the ROK Army and patients in prisoner-of-war hospitals. No Army nurse was killed due to enemy action in Korea, however, Major Genevieve Smith died in a C-47 crash en route to her duty assignment as chief nurse in Korea.

**Air Force Nurse Corps.** The Air Force Nurse Corps was challenged almost immediately upon the start of the war, being called upon to assist in air evacuations of casualties. On Dec. 5, 1950, the Nurse Corps assisted in the evacuation of about 3,900 patients after Chinese intervention in the war; by the end of the war, they helped evacuate about 350,000 patients. In December 1950, the 801st Medical Air Evacuation Squadron received the Presidential Unit Citation for heroism in the evacuation of more than 4,700 wounded servicemen after the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir Campaign. These flight nurses, sharing all the hardships of the regular flight crews, performed a myriad of other nursing tasks while reassuring the young patients. Two Air Force nurses, First Lieutenants Virginia May McClure and Margaret Fae Perry, were killed in Korea in a nonhostile aircraft accident.

**Navy Nurse Corps**

The need for naval medical facilities in Asia grew when the war began. A small naval dispensary at Yokosuka, staffed by only six nurses, evolved into a full-fledged hospital staffed by 200 nurses. The Navy Nurse Corps expanded its ranks by recalling Reserve nurses with World War II experience. It temporarily reduced staffs at continental hospitals to staff the forward area. The Navy also commissioned civilian nurses. These nurses served in hospitals as well as aboard three *Haven*-class ships where almost 35 percent of battle casualties were admitted through September 1952. These hospital ships were a new type of mobile hospital, moving from place to place, sometimes supporting the Inchon invasion or aiding the Hungnam evacuation, or simply shifting about the Korean coast as needed. Two senior Navy nurses, Commander Estelle Kalnoske Lange and Lieutenant Ruth Cohen, received the Bronze Star for their work on the Navy hospital ships.

Though outside the Korean theater, one aviation accident claimed the lives of 11 Navy nurses. The mishap occurred on the South Pacific island of Kwajalein on Sept. 19, 1950. These women were en route to hospitals in Japan to care for war casualties when their plane crashed into the Pacific shortly after take off.

**Women Marines.** In August 1950, the Women Reserves were mobilized for the Korean War; the number of women on active duty in the Marine Corps peaked at 2,787. The Korean War gave women serving in the Marine Corps new career opportunities outside of the usual clerical and administrative service and a chance to return to several duty stations. A 1951 report by the Procedures Analysis Office determined that Women Marines were capable of serving in 27 of 43 military occupational specialties such as personnel and administration, intelligence, logistics, mapping and surveying, fire control, instrument repair, electronics and aviation electronics, motor transport, public information, operational communications and disbursing. However, most Women Marines served in the traditional areas such as clerical and administration. For women officers, only nine fields were considered appropriate for women.

Prior to the Korean War, only a few of the women who had seen military service were granted a commission in the regular service. Most of these women were placed on inactive reserve status. At the onset of the Korean War, however, service requirements for women on inactive reserve status were extended. Thus, the Women Marines changed from an inactive reserve force to a core of trained personnel who had a minimum requirement of active duty service.

**Coast Guard SPARs.** On June 30, 1946, the Coast Guard demobilized its reserve program, including the Women's Reserve, nicknamed SPARs for Semper Peratus Always Ready. At the onset of the Cold War, and eventually the Korean War, the Coast Guard brought back a reserve program to meet personnel requirements brought about by new missions and increased activities. Former SPAR officers, through the rank of lieutenant only, were invited to rejoin the Coast Guard beginning in November 1949 and former SPAR enlisted personnel were recruited beginning in March 1950. Approximately 200 former SPARs voluntarily re-enlisted and served during the Korean War. They were primarily stationed at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., as well as the various district headquarters throughout the country. Most SPARs were released at the end of hostilities. By 1956 there were only nine enlisted women and 12 female officers in the Coast Guard — so few that *The Coast Guard Magazine* reported that "your chances of seeing a SPAR on active duty today have a slight edge over the possibilities of your running into Greta Garbo at the corner drugstore."

**Civilians.** Anna Rosenberg, a recognized labor relations expert and owner of a public relations firm, was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel in 1950. Her office was responsible for coordinating all Defense Department policies on military manpower and civilian personnel. An advocate of universal military training and integration of the Armed Forces, Rosenberg sought to improve the conditions of service life. To accomplish these goals, she recommended, with the approval of Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, the formation of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) in August 1951. This committee, comprised of 50 prominent women from academia, business, the arts, politics, the legal profession and former wartime women directors, led a unified recruiting drive to increase the number of women in the services. DACOWITS also promoted military service for women as a prestigious career and sought public acceptance of their broadened roles in the armed services. DACOWITS continues to exist today.

A unique example of another civilian woman involved in the Korean War was that of war correspondent Marguerite Higgins. Initially ordered by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker to leave Korea on the grounds that women did not belong on the war front, Higgins defied the demand and remained in Korea when General Douglas MacArthur overruled Walker. Covering the Korean War for the Herald Tribune for almost two years, Higgins provided eyewitness accounts of the war, including the assault at Inchon. She won a Pulitzer Prize and the Overseas Press Club Memorial Award for this reporting.

Personnel shortages during the Korean War led military leaders to revert to the World War II solutions of encouraging women to fill the ranks of the armed forces.

Although military leaders sought to increase the number of women in the military, overall, expansion efforts failed. Social pressures on women to maintain traditional roles in the home and family and the relative unpopularity of the Korean War hampered the recruitment of women into military service. While some opportunities for service in the theater of operations existed for women during the Korean War, the majority of servicewomen were concentrated in traditionally female administrative positions; the armed services merely duplicated the stereotypical civilian employment patterns of the 1950s.

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**Politics and The Korean War, Events Leading to the Conflict. (from Dod Korean War Commemoration Committee web page)**

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The United States took its first real interest in Korea during World War II in the context of discussions over how to dismantle the Japanese Empire. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, where the United States, Great Britain and China discussed wartime strategy and peace plans, the participants declared that ". . . in due course, Korea shall become free and independent." President Franklin D. Roosevelt favored a trusteeship in Korea; whereby the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union would temporarily govern the country until Korea could manage its own affairs. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt raised the issue of Korea again, proposing a trusteeship involving the United States, China and the Soviet Union, which could last twenty to thirty years. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin replied that the "shorter the period the better." With this general and vague agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin, discussion of the postwar future of Korea ended.

Roosevelt believed that a U.S.-Soviet trusteeship in Korea would provide the Soviet Union with an incentive for entering the war in the Pacific and encourage U.S.-Soviet cooperation. But after Roosevelt's death in April 1945, in the context of tension over the Soviet occupation policies in Eastern Europe, the tone of American-Soviet relations declined dramatically. As a consequence, the American position towards Korea began to change under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman.

The unconditional Japanese surrender on Aug. 14, 1945, came shortly after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With the sudden Japanese collapse came the threat that the Soviets, advancing into Manchuria and Korea, could quickly gain control of the entire Korean peninsula. In response, Army planners in the War Department and the State Department proposed a plan that would divide the peninsula in half, leaving the Soviets to occupy Korea north of the 38th parallel and an American occupation force south of the line. The Soviets agreed and moved quickly to occupy major cities north of the 38th parallel. The U.S. military arrived at Inchon on Sept. 8, and began occupying the southern half of the peninsula.

The simultaneous establishment of two zones led to the division that remains to this day.

In 1946, Stalin pronounced that international peace was impossible "under the present capitalist development of the world economy." The next year, George F. Kennan, a former counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, recommended that the proper response to the Soviet threat was "a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." To that end, Truman announced his approach to foreign policy saying, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain proposed trusteeship of Korea and created the Joint Soviet-American Commission. This commission sought to establish a provisional Korean democratic government. When its cooperative endeavors for Korean independence failed, the United States made one final attempt to resolve the Korean question, but the Soviets rejected that proposal. The U.S. then presented the issue before the United Nations (U.N.) on Sept. 14, 1947.

Soon after, in the spring of 1948, the U.N. General Assembly resolved that the Korean people would elect one national assembly for the whole country. South Koreans participated in a U.N.-supervised election in May 1948 that selected members of the National Assembly. That assembly ratified the country's constitution July 17, 1948. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established on Aug. 14, 1948. Dr. Syngman Rhee, an outspoken anti-communist and the State Department's choice to head an independent Korea, became the first president. Soviet authorities prohibited an election in the North and refused to permit the U.N. Election Commission to enter North Korea. The northern half of Korea held separate elections in the fall of 1948, establishing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and inaugurating Kim Il Sung as its new president.

With the creation of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Military Government ended its control. The 50,000 American occupation troops completed a gradual withdrawal by June 1949. Only the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), numbering approximately 500 American officers and enlisted men, remained to continue training Korean security forces. The existence of a communist insurgency coupled with the desire to prevent President Rhee from attempting to unify the peninsula by force, led the United States to structure the ROK Army as a constabulary force, a lightly-armed force designed to maintain internal order. In contrast, the Soviet Union outfitted the North Korean Army with heavy tanks and long-range artillery.

Also in 1949, the Chinese communists won the civil war in China. This success emboldened Kim Il Sung to make several trips to Moscow to persuade Stalin to support reunification of Korea by force. Not until Kim convinced the Soviet dictator that a North Korean invasion would quickly subdue the South before the United States could intervene did Stalin give his approval. The Soviets provided essential logistical support and technical advisors for the invasion force. In the spring of 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined America's strategic defense perimeter in Asia, which excluded the Korean peninsula. This confirmed Stalin and Kim's assessments of the strategic situation.

In June 1950, the United States was not prepared to wage war. Public sentiment against a large standing military establishment and the desire to produce consumer goods forced the government to reduce defense expenditures after World War II. America's policy of containment of communism and its increasing dependence on the atomic bomb and strategic air power caused a significant reduction in the strength of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. As a result, there were few trained units available for immediate commitment in Korea when the North Koreans invaded.

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Army attacked across the 38th parallel to unify the peninsula. That action caused President Truman to commit U.S. Forces, unprepared as they were, to the defense of South Korea. The United Nations Security Council simultaneously called upon member states to do likewise. For the first time, the United Nations authorized the establishment of a multinational force, flying the U.N. banner, to repel aggression.

When North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea, the United States, considering it an act of aggression, requested the United Nations take immediate action. On June 25, 1950 (New York time) the U.N. Security Council responded quickly by passing a resolution which called for immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. (The Soviet member was absent because of a boycott since January 1950, over the issue of seating communist China's representative in the United Nations). On June 27, after the Republic of Korea appealed to the United Nations for assistance, the Security Council passed another resolution recommending that United Nations members furnish assistance to South Korea as needed to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area." Fifty-three member nations approved the Security Council's recommendations.

Under a resolution introduced by Great Britain on July 7, the United Nations asked the United States to lead the Unified Command to put down the North Korean aggression. The United States accepted the responsibility and Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as commanding general. Twenty other countries (19 members and Italy, a nonmember at the time) contributed to the war effort.

The initial North Korean offensive drove the defenders into the southeast corner of the peninsula. There the Pusan Perimeter was established and, reinforced by American divisions, held through bitter battles. That stout defense made possible a brilliantly-conceived amphibious assault at Inchon, which enveloped the overextended North Korean Army and recaptured the capital city of Seoul. United Nations forces then advanced north to the Yalu River on the border between Korea and China, to try to reunify Korea.

In November 1950, concluding that the U.N. forces posed a threat to China, Mao Tse-tung ordered the massive intervention of the Chinese communist forces, which profoundly altered the nature of the war. Overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers and ill equipped for combat in sub-zero weather, U.N. forces withdrew to a line well south of Seoul, regrouped, and by March 1951, fought their way back to the 38th parallel. In April and May, the Chinese forces launched successive major offensives against U.N. troops.

In June 1951, with battle lines once again set along the pre-invasion boundary, Jacob Malik, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, suggested negotiations to terminate armed hostilities. During the two years of peace talks, opposing forces remained locked in bloody, inconclusive combat, at a tremendous loss of life. Finally, on July 27, 1953, representatives for the United States and North Korea (also representing China) signed the Military Armistice Agreement. The government of South Korea refused to sign because a permanently divided Korea was unacceptable. In the absence of a political settlement, that agreement continues to regulate the de facto boundary between the two Koreas. Today, there is still no official peace on the peninsula.

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE KOREAN WAR:

1945

The United States and Soviet Union had agreed earlier to have Japanese forces in the southern half of Korea, below the 38th parallel, surrender to the United States, and those north of the 38th parallel surrender to the Soviet Union. They also had agreed to democratically held elections to create a new Korean government. The United States honors the agreement, but the Soviet Union instead installs Kim Il-Sung as leader in the north. Educated in the Soviet Union, Kim is a staunch Communist. The temporary dividing line north of Seoul becomes more or less permanent, and by 1949, both the Soviets and the United States have withdrawn the bulk of their forces from the peninsula.

**1950**

**June 25: North Korea launches an all-out, pre-dawn attack** with 135,000 men, initiating war. Kim Il-Sung's avowed goal is to unify the peninsula under Communist rule. The invaders breach the 38th parallel and roll back the lightly armed Republic of Korea army constabulary forces toward Seoul.

**June 27:** The United Nations Security Council resolves to rescue South Korea from the invaders. The council names the United States as executive agent to implement the resolution and direct UN military operations in Korea. President Truman orders Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the Far East Command, to provider all necessary assistance. MacArthur commits air and naval forces. The United Nations appeals to all member countries to contribute to the military effort.

**June 27:** A U.S. 5th Air Force pilot shoots down the first enemy plane of the war over Seoul, capital of South Korea.

**June 29: First U.S. Ground Force Arrives in Korea:** Detachment X (35 men of the 507th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Bn.) It shoots down 1 YAK with M-55 machine guns at Suwan Airfield. Det. X sustains 5 WIA—first U.S. casualties of the Korean War.

**June 29:** U.S. Naval Forces Far East’s light cruiser USS Juneau fires the first salvo of the initial shore bombardment of the war on Korea’s eastern coast.

**June 29:** 5th Air Force’s 3rd Bombardment Group sends 18 B-26 Invader light bombers against Heijo Airfield near the North Korean capital of Pyongyang: 25 enemy aircraft are destroyed on the ground; one YAK fighter is shot down.

**July 1:** First U.S. infantry unit arrives in Korea: 1st Bn., 21st Inf. Regt., 24th ID. Along with A Battery, 52nd F.A. Bn., it comprises Task Force Smith.

**July 2: War’s Only U.S. Sea Battle.** Off Chumunjin, on Korea’s east coast, the Juneau helps destroy three of four attacking North Korean torpedo boats.

**July 3:** First U.N. carrier-based air strike of the war occurs when planes from the USS Valley Forge strike airfields in the Pyongyang-Chinnampo area of North Korea (N.K.).

**July 4- Aug 3: Delay of North Korean Invasion.** 3 U.S. divisions (24th, 25th, Ist Cav)

participate. U.S.: 1,991 KIA; 2,588 WIA.

**Jul 5: Battle of Osan.** First U.S. ground action of the war: Task Force Smith (406 infantrymen and 134 artillerymen) engages and delays advancing North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) units. U.S.: 20 KIA; 130 WIA. N.K.: 42 KIA; 85 WIA. First U.S. KIA is never identified.

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**Jul 6:** 24th ID regiments delay advancing NKPA at Pyongtaek, Chonan and Chochiwon.

**Jul 13-16: Battle at the Kum River.** 19th & 34th Inf. regiments (24th ID) delay the advancing NKPA at the Kum River line. 19th Regt. and other units suffer 650 casualties among the 3,401 men deployed.

**Jul 13:** B-29s of the 326th BS, 92nd Bombardment Group, conduct the first strike against N.K. (Wonsan) from Japan.

**Jul 19-20: Battle of Taejon.** 24th ID (3,933 GIs) defends the town against the NKPA. U.S.: 922 KIA/MIA (most MIA later confirmed KIA); 228 WIA.

**Jul 20:** 24th Inf. Regt. (25th ID) launches a counterattack at Yechon.

**July 24:** **MacArthur establishes General Headquarters, United Nations Command,** in Tokyo. UNC forces fight delaying actions as Republic of Korea and U.S. forces withdraw down the peninsula. Outnumbered and outgunned, they trade space for time as they wait for pledged assistance from other UN member-countries. The British arrive Aug. 29, and troop units from other UN members follow in rapid succession.

**Jul 25-26:** **Hadong Ambush.** 29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) is committed to combat near Chinju, and its 3rd Bn. (757 men) is decimated: 313 KIA and 100 captured. Second worst single-action U.S. loss of the war.

**Aug 1: Battle of the Notch.** 29th (attached) and 19th Infantry regiments (24th ID) engage NKPA. U.S.: 90 KIA.

**Aug 4: Defense of Pusan/Naktong Perimeter.** 84,478 U.S. troops participate:

**Aug 4-Sep 16:** 1st Cav, 2nd, 24th and 25th IDs, 5th RCT and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (PMB). U.S.: 4,599 KIA; 12,058 WIA; 2,107 MIA; and 401 POW.

**Aug 4:** First-ever aeromedical evacuation of U.S. casualties is performed by Marine VMO-6 helicopters.

**Aug 8-18: First Battle of the Naktong Bulge** ( Pusan Perimeter). The 24th ID, reinforced by 1st PMB and elements of the 2nd and 25th IDs, contains and repels the NKPA 4th Division’s penetration of the Naktong Perimeter.

**Aug 15-20: Battle of the Bowling Alley**. Fought west of Taegu on the Naktong Perimeter. U.S. 23rd (2nd ID) and 27th (25th ID) regiments maul the NKPA.

**Aug 17:** Hill 303 near Waegwon. 26 men of the 5th Cav Regt. are found bound and executed by the NKPA.

**Aug 31-Sep 19: Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge**. U.S. 1st Cav., 1st PMB,

2nd, 24th and 25th IDs engage enemy in fierce fighting.

**Sep:** Taejon. 42 U.S. soldiers are found executed by the NKPA.

**Sep 15: Inchon Landing** (Operation Chromite). X Corps (70,000 men)—7th ID and 1st Marine Div.—begins landing on Korea’s west coast. Marines secure their objective, sustaining 22 KIA and 174 WIA.

**Sep 16-27: Naktong Perimeter Breakout**. Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) breaks out of the Naktong Perimeter. 4 U.S. divisions (1st Cav, 2nd, 24th and 25th) participate. U.S.: 790 KIA; 3,544 WIA.

**Sep 17:** Kimpo Airfield is captured by the 3rd Bn., 5th Marines.

**Sep 18: Inchon Operation and Liberation of Seoul**. Seoul falls Sept. 27 after a week of fighting. 1st Marine Division—427 KIA; 5 MIA; 1,961 WIA. 7th ID —86 KIA; 10 MIA; 358 WIA.

**Sep 20-22:** 1st Marine Div. (absorbed the 1st PMB Sept. 13) crosses the Han River. 1st Marines capture Yongdungpo.

**Sep 26:** USS Brush hits a mine off Tanchon: 9 KIA; 10 WIA.

**Sep 29:** Minesweeper Magpie is destroyed by a mine off Chuksan, N.K.: 21 KIA. Next day, the USS Mansfield hits a mine, losing 5 MIA and 27 WIA.

**Oct 9: Invasion of North Korea**. I Corps, led by the 1st Cavalry Div., crosses the 38th Parallel north of Kaesong and attacks northward toward Pyongyang. 86 GIs are found massacred.

**Oct 12:** Minesweepers Pirate and Pledge are sunk by mines in Wonsan Harbor. Pirate loses 6 KIA; 43 WIA.

**Oct 19:** Pyongyang falls to the U.S. 1st Cavalry Div. and the 1st ROK (Republic of Korea) Division.

**Oct 20: War’s First Airborne Operation**. 187th Airborne RCT (187th Abn. Inf. and 674th F.A. Bn.) makes a parachute assault—by 2,860 paratroopers—on Sukchon and Sunchon north of Pyongyang. U.S.: 46 injured in jump accidents and 65 battle casualties. 75 GIs are found executed at Sunchon.

**Oct 23:** Kunsang, N.K.: 128 GIs are found executed.

**Oct 25:** Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launch their first offensive phase of the Korean War.

**Nov 1: Northernmost U.S. Action of the War**. 21st Inf. Regt. (24th ID) reaches the 8th Army’s "highwater mark" when it captures the village of Chonggodo, 18 air miles from Sinuiju and the Yalu River which separates North Korea from China.

**Nov 1-2: Battle of Unsan**. First U.S. battle with the CCF. 8th Cavalry Regt., 1st Cavalry Div., suffers heavy casualties: 1st Bn.—265 KIA or POW; 3rd Bn. —600 KIA or POW; and 5th Cav Regt.—350 losses.

**Nov 2-7:** Sudong. 7th Marine Regt. runs into heavy CCF resistance.

**Nov 8:** 79 B-29 Superfortress bombers plus Navy planes from TF 77 strike the Yalu River bridges at Sinuiju.

**Nov 8: First All-Jet Combat in History**. An F-80 Shooting Star of the 51st Fighter Intercepter Wing shoots down a MiG-15 fighter near Sinuiju in a 30-second dogfight.

**Nov 8:** Korean Service Medal authorized.

**Nov 21:** 17th Inf. Regt. (7th ID) reaches the Yalu River near its source at Hyesanjin on the Manchurian border.

**Nov 25 – Dec 15: CCF Counteroffensive in N.K.** 7 U.S. divisions participate (1st Cav., 1st Marine, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th and 25th IDs). U.S.: 562 KIA; 3,122 WIA.

**Nov 27- Dec 1:** 7th ID’s Task Force MacLean/Faith (elements of 31st & 32nd Inf. regiments) is annihilated east of the Chosin Reservoir, during the CCF counter offensive. Only 385 soldiers of its 3,200-man force survive.

**Nov 27 - Dec 9: Battle of the Chosin Reservoir**. Encircled 1st Marine Div. fights its way

southward from the Chosin Reservoir to the Hungnam Perimeter. Marine casualties: 4,418—718 KIA; 192 MIA and 3,508 WIA; and 7,313 losses due to frostbite or indigestion ailments.

**Nov 28:** Task Force Kingston, elements of the 7th ID’s 32nd Inf. Regt., reaches the Yalu River at Sin galpa jin.

**Nov 29-Dec 1: Battle of Kunu-ri**. CCF destroys the U.S. 2nd ID: 4,940 men are lost.

**Dec 3-7:** Task Force 90 (Amphibious Force Far East) evacuates Wonsan.

**Dec 10: Wonsan-Hungnam Campaign**. Ends this date. Casualties: X Corps—56 KIA; 69 WIA. 1st Marine Div.—885 KIA; 3,428 WIA. 3rd ID—227 KIA; 266 WIA. 7th ID—2,657 KIA; 354 WIA.

**Dec 24**: Hungnam operation is complete—105,000 U.S. and ROK personnel are evacuated by sea.

**1951**

**January** **"Great Pohang Guerrilla Hunt."** 1st Marine Div. routs guerrilla forces in the Masan-Pohang-Sondong-Andong area. Operations continue around Masan into February. Last major engagement is fought at Uisong. The North Korean 10th Div. is reduced in strength by 60%.

**Jan 1: Third Phase CCF Offensive:** 500,000 Communists push U.N. forces 50 miles south of the 38th Parallel and recapture Seoul.

**Jan 25- Feb 20: Operation Thunderbolt.** Counteroffensive against CCF. 6 U.S. Army IDs participate: (1st Cav., 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th): 667 KIA; 3,570 WIA.

**Feb 1: Battle of the Twin Tunnels.** 23rd Inf. Regt. (2nd ID), French Bn. and 347th F.A. Bn. confront several CCF regiments, killing at least 1,300 Chinese. U.S.: 45 KIA; 4 MIA; 207 WIA.

**Feb 5-24: Operation Roundup**. U.S. X Corps advances on the central front.

**Feb 5-9**: **Battle of Hill 440.** A task force of the 25th ID decimates attacking CCF.

**Feb 11-13: Battle of Hoengsong.** 2nd and 7th IDs and 187th Abn. RCT suffer 2,018 casualties. War’s largest concentrated loss of American lives occurs when 530 men of the 503rd & 15th Field Artillery Bns. are killed in an ambush.

**Feb12-21:** **CCF Counterattack, Wonju/Chipyong Area.** Three U.S. divisions (1st Cav., 2nd, 7th) participate. U.S.: 651 KIA; 1,296 WIA.

**Feb13-15:** **Battle of Chipyong-ni.** First mass assault by CCF: 18,000 troops. CCF offensive contained by 23rd RCT (2nd ID), French Bn., 1st Ranger Co., 37th F.A. Bn., and B Battery of the 82nd AAA Bn. U.S.: 94 KIA; 259 WIA.

**Feb 16- Jul 27 '53: Siege of Wonsan.** Task Force 95 (U.N. Blockade and Escort Force)

blockades Wonsan Harbor. An unprecedented 861-day naval operation, it is the longest effective siege of a port in U.S. Navy history.

**Feb 21- May 7: Operation Killer**. To drive the CCF north of the Han River. 5 U.S. divisions participate (1st Cav., 1st Marine, 2nd, 7th, 24th). U.S.: 144 KIA; 921 WIA.

**May 7- Apr 4: Operation Ripper**. Drives the Communists back to the 38th Parallel and

retakes Seoul. 7 U.S. divisions participate (1st Cav., 1st Marine, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th). U.S.: 566 KIA; 3,220 WIA.

**Mar 23: War’s Last Jump** (Operation Tomahawk). 187th Airborne RCT (2nd and 4th Ranger companies attached)—3,447 men—makes an air assault on Munsan-ni, 20 miles northwest of Seoul. 84 jump injuries; 1 KIA; 18 WIA.

**Apr 5-15: Operation Rugged.** To secure phase Line Kansas, or 38th Parallel. Enemy is entrenched in the Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyongyang area—"Iron Triangle." 6 U.S. Army divisions (1st Cav., 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th) participate.   
U.S.: 156 KIA; 901 WIA.

**Apr 11-22: Operation Dauntless**. To secure phase Line Utah. 3 U.S. Army divisions (3rd, 24th, 25th) participate: 95 KIA; 1,056 WIA.

**Apr 12**: War’s first major aerial duel—9 MiGs are shot down. Also, 40 MiGs attack a B-29 formation—3 are shot down.

**Apr 22**: Rotation plan implemented: Personnel will return to the U.S. individually after a specified number of months in Korea.

**Apr 22-29**: **CCF First Spring Offensive**. Largest single battle of the Korean War. CCF launch their Spring Offensive with 250,000 men in 27 divisions. Five U.S. Army divisions (2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 24th) and 1st Marine Division participate. U.S.: 314 KIA; 1,600 WIA.

**May 9**: U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF) launches a 300-plane strike on Sinuiju on the Yalu River. Largest raid of the war to date.

**May 16-21**: **Battle of the Soyang River**. "May massacre" along No Name Line. 2nd ID stems the enemy tide, inflicting severe casualties on the Chinese. 23rd Inf. Regt.—72 KIA; 158 WIA; 190 MIA.

**May 17-22**: **CCF Second Spring Offensive**. 4 U.S. divisions (1st Marine, 2nd, 3rd and 25th) participate: 333 KIA; 888 WIA.

**May 18**: TF 77 suffers its heaviest single-day casualties: 4 pilots KIA.

**May 20**: 4th Fighter Interceptor Group is jumped by 50 enemy jets over Sinuiju, resulting in America’s first jet ace of the war.

**May 20- Sept 20: Operation Strangle**. Massive all-out air interdiction campaign is carried out by FEAF, supported by TF 77 and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW).

**May 20-Jun: Operation Detonate**. To retake Line Kansas. 7 U.S. divisions participate

(1st Cav., 1st Marine, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 24th, 25th): 530 KIA; 3,195 WIA.

**Jun 3-12:** **Operation Piledriver**. To secure Line Wyoming and Iron Triangle. 4 U.S. Army divisions (1st Cav., 3rd, 7th, 25th) participate: 231 KIA; 1,787 WIA.

**Jun 10-16**: **Battle for the Punchbow**l. 1st Marine Div. encounters heavy NKPA resistance. Marines: 67 KIA; 1,044 WIA.

**Jun 12**: Destroyer Walke is hit by a mine off Hungnam, N.K.: 26 KIA and 35 WIA. This is the largest single Navy combat loss of the war.

**July (late)** **: Battle of Taeusan** (Hill 1179). 38th Inf. Regt. (2nd ID) captures the hill on the western edge of the Punchbowl.

**Aug 18 - Sept 5: Battle of Bloody Ridge** (Hill 983). U.S. 2nd ID and attached units sustain 326 KIA; 2,032 WIA; 414 MIA. Counted enemy dead total 1,389. 15th F.A. Bn. sets a record by firing 14,425 rounds in 24 hrs.

**Sept 13- Oct 15: Battle of Heartbreak Ridge** (Hill 931). 2nd ID seizes Ridge: 597 KIA; 3,064 WIA; 84 MIA. The 23rd Regt. alone takes 1,832 casualties.

**Sept 15-19: Assault on Hill 749.** U.S. Marines sustain 91 KIA; 714 WIA.

**Sept 21: Operation Summit.** A company of 228 Marines is lifted by 12 Sikorsky S-55s in the first helicopter deployment of a combat unit.

**Oct 3-9: Operation Commando**. To secure Line Jamestown. 3 U.S. Army divisions (1st Cav., 3rd, 25th) participate: 405 KIA; 2,238 WIA. (Vast majority of casualties are taken by the 1st Cav.)

**Oct 13**: **Operation Nomad and Polar.** To secure Line later designated Missouri. U.S.: 265 KIA; 1,487 WIA.

**Oct 23**: **Biggest Air Battle of War.** "Black Tuesday" over Namsi. By week’s end, 3 B-29s are shot down and 4 crash-land: 55 KIA/MIA.

**Nov 12-Nov 30: Offensive Operations Cease**. 8th Army begins ??????

In a rare pitched air battle, 31 F-86s take on 50 MiGs escorting 28 enemy bombers: 12 enemy planes are shot down.

**1952**

**Apr 17:** Presidential Executive Order 10345 extends enlistments involuntarily for nine months.

**Apr 21:** Cruiser St. Paul, while engaged in a gunfire support mission off Kojo, N.K., loses 30 men killed in a powder fire.

**May 25: Raid on Agok.** Nine tanks of the 245th Tank Bn., 45th ID, retailate for three raids on the division's sector

**May 28:** A patrol of the 179th Inf. Regt., 45th ID, is hit by two Chinese companies.

**May 31:** Enemy fires 102,000 rounds on 8th Army positions in May.

**Jun 6-14: Operation Counter.** 45th ID launches a two-phased series of attacks to establish 11 patrol bases in the Old Baldy area. 2nd and 3rd Bn’s, 180th Inf. Regt., fight fiercely for Outpost Eerie on Hill 191, which is counterattacked by two Chinese battalions.

**Jun 1:** Raid over Kwaksan: 3 U.S. bombers shot down.

**Jun 16-29:** Chinese launch a series of attacks against Outpost 9 (Snook), Outpost 10 (Pork Chop) and Outpost 11 (Old Baldy), all defended by the 179th Inf. Regt., 45th ID.

**Jun 23: Hydroelectric Plants Strike.** FEAF and 290 carrier planes bomb 9 hydroelectric power plants in North Korea.

**Jul 3:** 7th Marines, elements of the 45th ID and units of the 7th ID engage CCF units along various sectors of the front.

**Jul 11:** Pyongyang Raid. 91 U.N. aircraft hit 40 targets.

**Jul 17-Aug 4: Battle for Old Baldy** (Hill 266). 23rd Inf. Regt. (2nd ID) sustains 39 KIA, 234 WIA and 84 MIA by July 21.

**Aug 12-16 thru Sep 5-15: Battle of Bunker Hill** (Hill 122). First major Marine ground action in western Korea is fought by the 1st Marines: 48 KIA; 313 WIA.

**Aug 29: War’s Largest Air Raid**. FEAF and carrier planes bomb Pyongyang in a 1,403-plane assault—the largest single-day raid of the war.

**Aug 30**: Ocean tug Sarsi is sunk by a mine off Hungnam: 4 KIA and 4 WIA. Last U.S. naval vessel lost in the war.

**Sep**: An all-time single-day high of 45,000 rounds fall on the 8th Army’s front during September.

**Sep 1: Largest All-Navy Raid**. 144 planes from three carriers destroy the oil refinery at Aoji, N.K.

**Sep 6-8**: **Outpost Bruce** (Hill 148). During a 51-hour siege, U.S. Marines sustain 19 KIA and 38 WIA.

**Sep 17-24**: **Outpost Kelly**. 65th Inf. Regt. (3rd ID) is besieged by CCF. The regiment sustains 350 casualties.

**Sep 18-21**: Battle for Hill 266 continues with the 38th Inf. Regt. (2nd ID).

**Sep 22:** 245th Tank Bn., 45th ID, launches an attack on the Chinese.

**Sep 30:** During the month, units of the 5th Air Force shoot down 64 MiG-15s at a cost of 7 Sabrejets.

**Oct 9-Jul '53: Cherokee" Strikes**. 7th Fleet bombing campaign against battle-front enemy supply facilities.

**Oct 6-13**: **CCF Attack on Western & Central Fronts**. U.S.: 51 KIA; 348 WIA.

**Oct 14-25: Operation Showdown/Battle of Hill 598** (**Sniper Ridge). 7**th ID battles the Chinese near Kumhwa, the right leg of the Iron Triangle, and suffers 2,000 casualties.

**Oct 21:** USS Lewis is hit by a shore battery off Wonsan: 7 KIA.

**Oct 26-28** **Battle of the Hook**.: 7th Marines: 70 KIA; 386 WIA; 12 MIA; 27 POW.

**Nov 3**: **Hill 851**. Heartbreak Ridge area, held by the 2nd Bn., 160th Inf. Regt. (40th ID) withstands an NKPA attack. U.S.: 19 KIA; 54 WIA.

**Dec 25**: **T-Bone Hill**. 38th Inf. Regt. (2nd ID) repels CCF during an intense battle.

**Dec 25**: **Hill 812**. Held by Co. K, 3rd Bn, 179th Inf., 45th ID; hit hard by NKPA.

**1953**

**Jan:** 270,000 Chinese and North Korean troops man enemy lines.

**Jan 25: Operation Smack.** Assault on Spud Hill by elements of the 31st Inf. Regt.

**Feb 3: Hill 101/Ungok**. 5th Marines conduct a raid and sustain 15 KIA; 55 WIA.

**Mar 9**: A 7th ID 34-man patrol loses 20 KIA, 2 MIA and 12 WIA in CCF ambush. A 2nd ID 34-man patrol also loses 12 KIA and 5 MIA in another ambush.

**Mar 17:** Aircraft of TF 77 devastate Chongjin, N.K.

**Mar 17: Hill 355** (Little Gibraltar). CCF assualt the 9th Inf. Regt. (2nd ID).

**Mar 20:** War’s heaviest naval bombardment on Communist lines at Kosong.

**Mar 23-24: Old Baldy/Pork Chop Complex.** Held by 31st Inf. (7th ID). 32nd Regt. relieves the 31st. Units sustain 300 casualties during a Chinese attack.

**Mar 26-30: Nevada Cities’ Outposts** (Vegas-Reno-Carson). CCF attack the 5th Marines. CCF regiment is destroyed. Marines: 214 KIA; 801 WIA; 19 POW.

**Apr 16-18: Battle of Pork Chop Hill**. 17th and 31st regiments (7th ID) hit hard by CCF and suffer heavy casualties.

**Apr 20-26**: **Operation Little Switch** exchanges 149 sick and wounded U.S. POWs.

**May 13**: **Raid on Toksan Dam**. A dramatic strike by the 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing destroys a major irrigation system.

**May 28-30**: CCF launches a regimental-strength attack against I Corps sector. Savage fighting ensues in Nevada Cities and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery fight in support of the defending 25th ID line units. Co. B., 1st Bn., 14th Inf., takes Outpost Elko.

**Jun 10-18**: **Siege of Outpost Harry**. U.S. 3rd ID’s 15th Regt. and 5th RCT withstand an assault by the CCF 74th Div. Chinese suffer 4,200 casualties. U.S.: 174 KIA; 824 WIA during CCF attack on ROKs.

**Jun 15**: USS Princeton launches 184 sorties, establishing the single-day Korean War record for offensive sorties flown from a carrier.

**Jun 15**: Navy and Marine Corps aircraft fly 910 sorties—the highest combined number for a single day.

**Jun 24**: U.S. 40th and 45th divisions and 5th RCT are redeployed along the front lines to bolster the ROKs during a renewed CCF offensive.

**Jun 30**: Marine Air Group 12 flies a record-breaking 217 combat sorties.

**Jun 30**: During June, Sabrejets down 77 enemy aircraft.

**Jun 30:** The war’s peak monthly artillery rounds of 2,710,248 are fired during June.

**Jul 6-10: Battle of Pork Chop Hill**. 7th ID is ordered to evacuate its defensive positions after five days of fighting and heavy casualties.

**Jul 7-8**: **Outposts Berlin-East Berlin** (7th Marines right sector) are attacked during the Marine relief of the 25th ID. Marines: 21 KIA; 126 WIA.

**Jul 10-15:** U.S. unit to go farthest north of the 38th Parallel: At Kumsong, A Battery of the 300th Armored Artillery Bn. supports ROK 6th Division.

**Jul 13-20: Battle of Kumsong River Salient.** Last Communist offensive. CCF launches a six-division attack partly directed at the U.S. IX Corps (3rd, 40th, 45th IDs). 187th RCT is attached to 2nd ID during the fighting. U.S.: 182 KIA; 718 WIA.

**Jul 14:** U.S. 555th Field Artillery Bn. is overrun, losing 300 KIA and MIA.

**Jul 19-20: Outposts Berlin-East Berlin**—held by only 81 Marines—are overrun, but reinforced. Marines: 6 KIA; 44 MIA; 12 POW and 86 WIA.

**Jul 24-26**: **Final U.S. Ground Combat**. Heavy enemy (3,000 men) attack is launched in the Berlin Complex ("Boulder City") area held by the 7th and 1st Marines. U.S.: 43 KIA; 316 WIA. Last Marine ground actions of the war are fought on Hills 111 and 119. Central Sector: 3rd ID units assaulted on Sniper Ridge.

**Jul 25**: TF 77 planes fly 538 offensive plus 62 defensive sorties—a record number for a single day.

**Jul 27**: **Last Air Kill of the War**. An enemy transport is downed near the Manchurian border.

**Jul 27**: **Last U.S. KIA**. Sgt. Harold R. Cross, Jr., of 3rd Plt., K Co., 3rd Bn., 5th RCT, is KIA in a mortar blast just prior to the 10 p.m. cease-fire.

**Jul 27**: **Korean War Ends.**  **More than 302,000 U.S. troops are based in South Korea** when an armistice is signed at Panmunjom, ending the fighting and calling for a political settlement of the war. Troops on both sides pull back 2,000 meters from the last line of military contact to insure peace, watch the Demilitarized Zone and guard against further hostilities. Total U.S. casualties: 33,651 hostile deaths; 103,284 WIA; 7,140 POWs. Static warfare (1951-53) alone claims 1,586 (39.6%) Marine infantry lives and 11,244 (43.9%) WIA, and of Marines/Army combined—12,300 KIA (36.5%) and 50,900 (49%) WIA. Non-hostile U.S. deaths: 3,262.

**Jul 28**: **Last U.S. Casualties**. Five GIs of Cos. B and C, 23rd Inf. Regt. (2nd ID) are killed in an accidental explosion near Ansan, N.K.

**Jul 31**: **Peak U.S. Ground Troop Strength**: 302,483. Total of 1,587,040 U.S. personnel serve in Korea during the war. Some 198,380 or 12.5% actually fight in combat.

**Sep**: **Operation Big Switch**. Last of 3,597 U.S. POWs are released.

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**1954**

**Republic of Korea and the United States sign a mutual security agreement** that commits both nations to assist each other in case of outside attack.

**The Combined Forces Command is established**, providing for a ROK-U.S. coordinated response to any act of aggression against South Korea.

**1998**

**The United States repatriates the remains of five Americans listed as Missing in Action** from the Korean War. Recovering remains from North Korea is part of a balancing act between U.S. and North Korean officials at several different levels.

The United States routinely deals with North Korea during peace talks at Punmunjom, and different agencies have contributed food to North Koreans starving during a nation wide famine.

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**LEGEND used throughout chronology:**


KIA Killed in Action, MIA Missing in Action ,WIA Wounded in Action, POW Prisoner of War

ID Infantry Division, NKPA North Korean People’s Army, PMB Provisional Marine Brigade


CCF Chinese Communist Forces, FEAF Far East Air Force (U.S.)

**U.S. Weapons of War.** The following basic details will help you field questions about the weapons carried by the troopsportrayed in the statues. …hopefully you can turn such questions into deeper discussions of the statues and the men and events they honor, not just a discussion about weaponry.


**US Rifle, Caliber .30, M1 Garand:** This was the first semiautomatic rifle to be selected as the standard small arm of the US military. First adopted in 1836, the M1 Rifle served U.S. forces in WW II, Korea, and several police actions and interventions since then. It was designed for semi-automatic fire using a spring steel clip which contained 8 rounds. It had a maximum effective range of 400 meters. The weapon weighed 11.25 pounds when fully loaded. General George S Patton called it “the greatest combat implement ever devised.”




**The U.S. M1 Carbine, Caliber .30:** This was the weapon of choice for support troops because it was lighter than the M1 Rifle but more effective than a pistol. However, in extreme cold, the weapon tended to malfunction more often, like during the Chosin Reservoir battle. It was used in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam. The weapon weighed nearly 7 pounds, fully loaded, and had an effective range of 300 yards.



**The M1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR):** A previous version of this weapon saw duty in WW I, but this version was adopted in 1940. The 9-man Army infantry squad was tactically organized around a single BAR. The 13-man USMC squad was organized around three fire teams, each organized around one BAR. Therefor, each Army infantry platoon had four BARs and each USMC platoon had nine BARs. This was a poular weapon in both WW II and Korea because it was so reliable and it offered rapid fire and penetrating power. However, if fully equipped with its bipod and bandoleer of ammunition, it weighed nearly 40 pounds.



**M1917A1 Water Cooled Machine Gun or the M1919A4 .30 Caliber Air Cooled Machine Gun.** Much lighter than their .50 caliber counterparts, these weapons were still relatively heavy, with the air cooled version weighing 41 pounds for gun and tripod, and the water cooled version a hefty 93 pounds for both pieces. They had an effective range of 1000 meters and a rate of fire of 400-550 rounds per minute. The lighter air cooled weapon was easier to set up and thus became the favorite for offensive operations, however, it was not as reliable or accurate as the water cooled M1917. Therefore, the water cooled version was preferred in the defense, or bitter cold conditions where its greater rate of sustained fire was often key.



**The Korean War, A Fresh Perspective,** By Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U.S. Army (ret.) Forty-five years after shipping out to fight in Korea, Harry Summers got new insight into what the war had been all about.

Dismissed as the "forgotten war," Korea was in actuality one of America's most significant conflicts. Although born of a misapprehension, the Korean War triggered the buildup of U.S. forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), began American involvement in the Vietnam War, and, although seen as an aberration at the time, now serves as the very model for America's wars of the future.

One reason the importance of the Korean War is not better appreciated is that from the very start the conflict presented confusing and contradictory messages. Historian and Korean War combat veteran T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in his classic This Kind of War: "Americans in 1950

rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life--but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud." Fehrenbach concluded: "By April 1951, the Eighth Army had again proven Erwin Rommel's assertion that American troops knew less but learned faster than any fighting men he had opposed. The tragedy of American arms, however, is that having an imperfect sense of history, Americans sometimes forget as quickly as they learn." Those words proved to be only too true.

Two years later, as the war came to an end, Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter declared that "Korea was a unique, never-to-be-repeated diversion from the true course of strategic air power." For the next quarter century, nuclear weaponry dominated U.S. military strategy. As a result, General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Eighth Army's last wartime commander (and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War), complained that "there was no thoroughgoing analysis ever made of the lessons to be learned from Korea, and later policy makers proceeded to repeat many of the same mistakes."

The most damning mistake those policy-makers made was to misjudge the true nature of the war. As Karl von Clausewitz, the renowned Prussian philosopher of war, wrote in 1832: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander has to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking....This is the first of all strategic questions and the most important."

As President Harry S. Truman's June 27, 1950, war message makes evident, the U.S. assumption was that monolithic world communism, directed by Moscow, was behind the North Korean invasion. "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt," said Truman, "that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."

That belief, later revealed as false, had enormous and far-reaching consequences. Believing that Korea was a diversion and that the main attack would come in Europe, the United States began a major expansion of its NATO forces. From 81,000 soldiers and one infantry division stationed in Western Europe when the war started, by 1952 the U.S. presence had increased to six divisions--including the National Guard's 28th and 43rd Infantry divisions--503 aircraft, 82 warships and 260,800 men, slightly more than the 238,600 soldiers then in combat in Korea.

Another critical action was the decision to become involved in Vietnam. In addition to ordering U.S. military forces to intervene in Korea, Truman directed "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces."

On September 17, 1950, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina was formed, an organization that would grow to the half-million-strong Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) before U.S. involvement in that country came to an end almost a quarter century later. As in Korea, the notion that monolithic world communism was behind the struggle persisted until almost the very end.

The fact that such an assumption was belied by 2,000 years of Sino-Vietnamese hostility was ignored, and it was not until Richard Nixon's diplomatic initiatives in 1970 that the United States became aware of, and began to exploit, the fissures in that so-called Communist monolith. By then it was too late, for the American people had long since given up on Vietnam.

The fact that the U.S. response to both the Korean War and the Vietnam War was built on the false perception of a Communist monolith began to emerge after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. At a July 1995 conference I attended at Georgetown University, Dr. Valeri Denissov, deputy director of the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, revealed the true nature of the Korean War's origins.

Drawing from the hitherto secret documents of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Denissov revealed that far from being the instigator of the war, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin was at best a reluctant partner. In September 1949, the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party rejected an appeal from North Korea's Kim Il Sung to assist in an invasion of the South. But in April 1950, says Denissov, Stalin changed his mind and agreed to provide assistance for an invasion of the South. For one thing, Kim had convinced Stalin that the invasion was a low-risk operation that could be successfully concluded before the United States could intervene.

"Thus," said Denissov, "the documents existing in Russian archives prove that...it was Kim Il Sung who unleashed the war upon receiving before-hand blessings from Stalin and Mao Zedong [Mao Tse-tung]."

Why did Stalin change his mind? The first reason lay in Mao Tse-tung's victory in the Chinese Third Civil War. Denissov asserted that "Stalin believed that after the U.S.A. deserted Chiang Kai-shek 'to his own fortunes' in the internal Chinese conflict they would not risk a participation in a Korean-Korean war as well." Another factor, Denissov believed, was that "the Soviet Union had declared the creation of its own nuclear bomb, which according to Stalin's calculations deprived Americans of their nuclear monopoly and of their ability to use the 'nuclear card' in the confrontation with the Soviet Union."

Another Russian Foreign Ministry official at the conference, Dr. Evgeny Bajanov, added yet another reason for Stalin's change of heart--the "perceived weakness of Washington's position and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia."

That perception was well-founded. Dispatched to Korea at the end of World War II to disarm the Japanese there, the U.S. military was not too fond of the country from the start. When I arrived at the replacement depot at Yongdungpo in November 1947, our group was addressed by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, commander of the XXIV Corps and of U.S. forces in Korea. "There are only three things the troops in Japan are afraid of," he said. "They're gonorrhea, diarrhea and Korea.

And you've got the last one."

After a year with the 6th Infantry Division in Pusan--a time spent mostly confined to barracks because of the civil unrest then sweeping the country--I was only too glad to see the division deactivated in December 1948 and myself transferred to the 24th Infantry Division in Japan. In 1949, the 7th Infantry Division, the only remaining U.S. combat unit in Korea, was also transferred to Japan, leaving only the several hundred men of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).

"In Moscow," Denissov said, "American military presence in South Korea in 1945-1949 was viewed as a 'deterring factor' which became defunct after America's withdrawal from the South." Yet another sign of lack of American will was Secretary of State Dean Acheson's public

statement in January 1950 that Korea was outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. Finally, Moscow must have been well aware of the drastic cuts made in America's defenses by the false economies of Truman and Louis Johnson, his feckless secretary of defense.

While Stalin's and Kim Il Sung's perceptions of U.S. lack of resolve may have been well-founded, they were also wrong. During a Pentagon briefing in 1974, General Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was asked about the unpredictability of U.S. reaction. "If a Soviet KGB spy had broken into the Pentagon or the State Department on June 25, 1950, and gained access to our most secret files," Walters said, "he would have found the U.S. had no interest at all in Korea. But the one place he couldn't break into was the mind of Harry Truman, and two days later America went to war over Korea."

In taking the United States to war in Korea, Truman made two critical decisions that would shape future military actions. First, he decided to fight the war under the auspices of the United Nations, a pattern followed by President George Bush in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and, currently, by President Bill Clinton in Bosnia. Second, for the first time in American military history, Truman decided to take the nation to war without first asking Congress for a declaration of war. Using the U.N. Security Council resolution as his authority, he said the conflict in Korea was not a war but a "police action."

With the Soviet Union then boycotting the U.N. Security Council, the United States was able to gain approval of U.N. resolutions labeling the North Korean invasion a "breach of the peace" and urging all members to aid South Korea.

The United States was named executive agent for the conduct of the war, and on July 10, 1950, Truman appointed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief of the U.N. Command. In reality, however, the U.N. involvement was a facade for unilateral U.S. action to protect its vital interests in northeast Asia. The U.N. Command was just another name for MacArthur's Far East Command in Tokyo.

At its peak strength in July 1953, the U.N. Command stood at 932,539 ground forces. Republic of Korea (ROK) army and marine forces accounted for 590,911 of that force, and U.S. Army and Marine forces for another 302,483. By comparison, other U.N. ground forces totaled some 39,145 men, 24,085 of whom were provided by British Commonwealth Forces (Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and 5,455 of whom came from Turkey.

While the U.N. facade was a harmless delusion, Truman's decision not to seek a declaration of war set a dangerous precedent. Claiming their war making authority rested in their power as commanders in chief, both Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon refused to ask

Congress for approval to wage war in Vietnam, a major factor in undermining support for that conflict. It was not until the Gulf War in 1991 that then President Bush rejected suggestions that he follow the Korean precedent and instead, as the Constitution provides, asked Congress for permission to wage war.

All those political machinations, however, were far from the minds of those of us then on occupation duty in Japan. We were as surprised as Stalin and Kim Il Sung at Truman's orders to go into action in Korea. For one thing, we were far from ready. I was then a corporal with the 24th Infantry Division's heavy tank battalion, only one company of which was activated--and that unit was equipped not with heavy tanks but with M-24 Chaffee light reconnaissance tanks, armed with low-velocity 75mm guns, that proved to be no match for the North Koreans' Soviet-supplied T-34 85mm-gun medium tanks.

Also inadequate were the infantry's 2.36-inch anti-tank rocket launchers. Radios did not work properly, and we were critically short of spare parts. Instead of the usual three rifle battalions, the infantry regiments had only two. And our field artillery battalions had only two of their three authorized firing batteries. Although our officers and sergeants were mostly World War II combat veterans, we were truly a "hollow force."

The 24th Infantry Division was the first U.S. ground combat unit committed to the war, with its initial elements landing in Korea on July 1, 1950. We soon found ourselves outgunned by the advancing North Korean People's Army (NKPA). All of our tanks were lost to the NKPA T-34s, and our commander was killed for want of a starter solenoid on our tank retriever. Going into action with some 16,000 soldiers, the 24th Division had only 8,660 men left by the time it was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Division on July 22.

The shock of those initial disasters still reverberates throughout the U.S. Army more than four decades later. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the watchwords of Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan were "Remember Task Force Smith," a warning not to let the Army again become the hollow force of 1950 that paid in blood for America's unpreparedness.

Task Force Smith was the first of the 24th Infantry Division's units to be committed. Named after its commander, Lt. Col. Charles B. "Brad" Smith, the task force consisted of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and "A" Battery, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion. The task force came under attack by the infantry columns of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division and the T-34s of the 209th Armored Brigade at Osan on July 5, 1950. Outnumbered and unable to stop the NKPA tanks, it was forced to fall back toward Taejon. There, the remainder of the 24th Infantry Division made a stand until July 20, before being pushed back into the Naktong Perimeter--losing the commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean (captured by the NKPA), in the process. Although at a terrible price, it had bought time for the remainder of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) to move from Japan to Korea. Contrary to Kim Il Sung's calculations, America had been able to intervene in time. North Korea's attempt to conquer South Korea in one lightning stroke had been thwarted.

Wars are fought on three interconnected levels. At first, the United States was on the operational (i.e., theater of war) and tactical (i.e., battlefield) defensive, but at the strategic (i.e., national policy) level, it was still pursuing the same policy of "rollback and liberation" that it had followed in earlier wars. That policy called for temporarily going on the defensive to buy time to prepare for a strategic offensive that would carry the war to the enemy in order to destroy his will to resist.

While EUSA held the Naktong River line against a series of North Korean assaults, General MacArthur laid plans to assume the strategic, operational and tactical offensive with a landing behind enemy lines at Inchon.

In a brilliant strategic maneuver, MacArthur sent his X Corps ashore on September 15, 1950. Consisting of the Army's 7th Infantry Division and the Marine 1st Division, it rapidly cut the enemy's lines of supply and communication to its forces besieging the Naktong Perimeter to the south, forcing them to withdraw in disarray. While X Corps pressed on to recapture Seoul, South Korea's capital city, EUSA broke out of the Naktong Perimeter and linked up with X Corps near Osan on September 26. Seoul fell the next day.

"After the Inchon landing," Secretary of State Acheson told the Senate in May 1951, "General MacArthur called on these North Koreans to turn in their arms and cease their efforts; that they refused to do, and they retired into the North, and what General MacArthur's military mission was, was to pursue them and round them up [and] we had the highest hopes that when you did that the whole of Korea would be unified."

On Korea's western coast, EUSA crossed the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea and captured the North Korean capital of Pyongyang on October 19, 1950. EUSA continued to drive north against light opposition, and on November 1, 1950, it reached its high-water mark when the village of Chongdo-do, 18 air miles from the Yalu River separating Korea and the Chinese province of Manchuria, was captured by the 21st Infantry Regiment.

Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, X Corps had moved into northeastern Korea. The 1st Marine Division occupied positions around the Chosin Reservoir, while on November 21, elements of the Army's 7th Infantry Division's 17th Infantry Regiment reached the Yalu River near its source at Hyesanjin in eastern Korea. It seemed as though the war was over.

But disaster was at hand. On October 4, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse-tung had secretly ordered "Chinese People's Volunteers" into action in Korea. Those Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) consisted of some 380,000 soldiers, organized into two army groups, nine corps-size field armies

and 30 infantry divisions.

From October 13 to 25, the 130,000-man CCF XIII Army Group covertly crossed the Yalu River in the western sector opposite EUSA. Two weeks later, the 120,000-man CCF IX Army Group also moved surreptitiously into the eastern sector in Korea, opposite X Corps. Because of intelligence failures, both in Washington and in Korea, the Chinese managed to achieve almost total surprise. Their intervention would change not only the battlefield conduct of the war but also its strategic nature.

According to the Soviet archives, in May 1950, Mao had agreed to join with the Soviet Union and support the North Korean invasion of South Korea. As the Russian Foreign Ministry's Evgeny Bajanov noted at the 1995 Georgetown conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai "confirmed [on July 2, 1950] that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops disguised as Koreans would engage the opponent" and that Chinese armies had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden in Manchuria. "In August-September 1950 on a number of occasions," said Bajanov, "Mao personally expressed concerns over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean peninsula 'to mince' American divisions." But when Stalin sent a message to Mao on October 1, asking him to "come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime," Mao refused, instead suggesting "the Koreans should accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics."

Under intense Soviet pressure, however, on October 13, "the Chinese, after long deliberation, did agree to extend military aid to North Korea," said Bajanov. "Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and provide them with air cover. According to the available information, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Pro-Soviet Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai [who would later command the CCF in Korea] finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was that if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution."

In any event, after feints in early November against EUSA at Unsan and against X Corps at Sudong, both of which were ignored by Far East Command intelligence officers, the CCF launched its main attack. On November 25, the XIII Army Group struck the EUSA, driving it out of North Korea and retaking Seoul on January 4, 1951. Meanwhile, on November 27, the CCF IX Army Group struck X Corps, and by December 25, 1950, had forced its evacuation from North Korea as well.

At first, both Moscow and Beijing were elated. On January 8, 1951, Bajanov reported, Stalin cabled Mao, "From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades with the capture of Seoul." But Bajanov added, "By the end of January 1951...the euphoria of Communists started to decline and quite soon it disappeared and was replaced with worries, fear, confusion and at times panic."

What made the difference was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who took command of EUSA on December 26, 1950, replacing Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, who had been killed in a jeep accident. Ridgway turned EUSA from dejection and defeat into a tough, battle-ready force within a matter of weeks. "The Eighth Army," wrote Fehrenbach, "rose from its own ashes in a killing mood....By 7 March they stood on the Han. They went through Seoul, and reduced it block by block....At the end of March, the Eighth Army was across the parallel."

Attempting to stem that tide, on April 22, 1951, the CCF launched its great spring offensive, sending some 250,000 men and 27 divisions into the attack along a 40-mile front north of Seoul. It was the largest battle of the war, but by May 20 the CCF, after some initial gains, had been turned back with terrible losses. As Time magazine put it, "The U.S. expended ammunition the way the Chinese expended men." After that success, the United States was in good position to retake the offensive and sweep the CCF from Korea. But Washington ordered EUSA to maintain its defensive posture, for U.S. military policy had changed from rollback and liberation to containment. That ruled out battlefield victory, for the best possible result of defensive operations is stalemate.

On July 10, 1951, armistice talks began between the U.N. Command and the CCF/NKPA. After the front line stabilized in November 1951, along what was to become the new demarcation line, the fighting over the next 20 months degenerated into a bloody battle for terrain features like Old Baldy, Heartbreak Ridge and Pork Chop Hill. The U.S. forces suffered some 63,200 casualties to gain or retain those outposts. With victory no longer in sight, public support for the war plummeted, and in 1952 Truman decided not to run for re-election rather than risk almost certain defeat. With the signing of the armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, the war finally came to an end.

Dwarfed by the total U.S. victory in World War II, the negotiated settlement in Korea seemed to many observers to be a defeat and at best a draw. Certainly it seemed no model for the future.

As indicated previously, it was Eisenhower's strategy of massive nuclear retaliation that dominated the immediate postwar era. Conventional forces, like the Korean War itself, were dismissed as irrelevant. Even when the atomic war strategies were challenged by the John F. Kennedy administration's policy of flexible response, conventional forces were still ignored in favor of the "new" counterinsurgency war. Vietnam would be its test case.

The Vietnam War, like the Korean War, was pursued on the strategic defensive--the United States still not realizing that the best result possible was stalemate. In Korea, U.S. forces kept the external enemy at bay while giving local forces responsibility for counterguerrilla operations. But in Vietnam, this strategy--the only one with any hope of success--was regarded as ineffective, even though the Korean War objective of preserving South Korea's independence had been attained.

Only in the wake of an unqualified failure in Vietnam, where Saigon fell not to guerrilla attack but to a Korea-style cross-border blitzkrieg by the North Vietnamese army, did the limited validity of both nuclear war and counterinsurgency operations become evident. The most probable future conflict was still a war fought with conventional weapons in pursuit of limited political goals--in short, another Korea.

That was exactly what happened in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and what the Pentagon is now prepared for with its policy of being able to fight two regional conflicts almost simultaneously.

One of those potential regional conflicts is Korea. As President Bill Clinton told the Korean National Assembly in July 1993, "The Korean peninsula remains a vital American interest." As proof of U.S. resolve, almost a half century after it was decimated at Kunu-ri protecting EUSA's withdrawal from North Korea, the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division currently sits astride the Seoul invasion corridor as a tripwire guaranteeing certain U.S. involvement in any future conflict

there.\*

For further reading, Vietnam Magazine editor Harry G. Summers, Jr., recommends his book Korean War Almanac, and In Mortal Combat, Korea, 1950­1953, by John Toland.

**Task Force Smith.**

(from Chapter VI, *UNITED* *STATES* *ARMY* *IN* *THE* *KOREAN* *WAR* SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU (June-November 1950) *by Roy* *E*. *Appleman CENTER* *OF* *MILITARY* *HISTORY UNITED* *STATES* *ARMY WASHINGTON*, *D*.*C*.)

**American Ground Forces Enter the Battle**

*If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.*-SUN TZU, The Art of War

Across the Korea Strait events of importance were taking place in Japan that would soon have an impact on the Korean scene. In Tokyo, General MacArthur on 30 June instructed General Walker, commander of Eighth Army, to order the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. Its proximity to Korea was the principal reason General MacArthur selected it for immediate commitment. [1] General Walker gave Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Commanding General, 24th Division, preliminary verbal instructions concerning the division.

These instructions were formalized in an Eighth Army Operation Order at 0315 1 July which provided that

1. a delaying force of two rifle companies, under a battalion commander, reinforced by two platoons of 4.2-inch mortars and one platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles was to go by air to Pusan and report to General Church for orders;
2. the division headquarters and one battalion of infantry were to go to Pusan by air at once;
3. the remainder of the division would follow by water;
4. a base was to be established for early offensive operations. The mission of the advance elements was phrased as follows: "Advance at once upon landing with delaying force, in accordance with the situation, to the north by all possible means, contact enemy now advancing south from Seoul towards Suwon and delay his advance." [2]

The order also stated that General Dean would assume command of all U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) upon his arrival there. In the next few days Eighth Army transferred a total of 2,108 men to the 24th Division from other units to bring it up to full authorized strength, most of them from the other three infantry divisions. The division, thus readied for the movement to Korea, numbered 15,965 men and had 4,773 vehicles. [3]

**Task Force Smith Goes to Korea**

On the evening of 30 June, Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, went to bed at 9 o'clock in his quarters at Camp Wood near Kumamoto, Kyushu, tired and sleepy after having been up all the previous night because of an alert. An hour and a half later his wife awakened him, saying, "Colonel Stephens is on the phone and wants you." At the telephone Smith heard Col. Richard W. Stephens, Commanding

Officer, 21st Infantry, say to him, "The lid has blown off-get on your clothes and report to the CP." Thus began Task Force Smith as seen by its leader. [4] Colonel Smith had been at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, causing him hurriedly to take D Company, 35th Infantry, to form a defense position on Barbers Point. Now, this call in the night vividly reminded him of that earlier event.

At the regimental command post, Colonel Stephens told Smith to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to Itazuke Air Base; it was to fly to Korea at once. General Dean would meet him at the airfield with further instructions. Colonel Stephens quickly arranged to lend Smith officers from the 3d Battalion to fill gaps in the rifle platoons of B and C Companies. By 0300 1 July Colonel Smith and his men were on trucks and started on the seventy-five mile drive from

Camp Wood to Itazake. They rode in a downpour of rain, the same monsoon deluge that descended on General Church and his ADCOM party that night on the road from Suwon to Taejon. Smith's motor convoy reached Itazake at 0805.

General Dean was waiting for Smith at the airfield. "When you get to Pusan," he said to him, "head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Contact General Church. If you can't locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give you more information. That's all I've got. Good luck to you, and God bless you and your men." [5]

Thus, the fortunes of war decreed that Colonel Smith, a young infantry officer of the West Point Class of 1939 who had served with the 25th Division in the Pacific in World War II, would command the first American ground troops to meet the enemy in the Korean War. Smith was about thirty-four years of age, of medium stature, and possessed a strong, compact body. His face was friendly and open.

Assembled at Itazake, Colonel Smith's force consisted of the following units and weapons of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment: 2 under-strength rifle companies, B and C; one-half of Headquarters Company; one-half of a communications platoon; a composite 75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon of 4 guns, only 2 of which were airlifted; and 4 4.2-inch mortars, only 2 airlifted. The

organization of B and C Companies included 6 2.36-inch bazooka teams and 4 60-mm. mortars. Each man had 120 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition and 2 days of C rations. In all, there were about 440 men, of whom only 406 were destined to be in the group air-landed in Korea that day. [6]

Smith's force had a liberal sprinkling of combat veterans from World War II. About one-third of the officers had had combat experience either in Europe or in the Pacific. About one-half of the noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans, but not all had been in combat. Throughout the force, perhaps one man in six had had combat experience. Most of the men were young, twenty years old or less.

Only six C-54 planes were available for the transport job. The first plane was airborne at 0845. The first and second planes upon arrival over the small runway near Pusan found it closed in with fog and, unable to land, they returned to Japan. Colonel Smith was on the second plane but he could not land in Korea until the tenth flight-between 1400 and 1500. Colonel Emmerich, who the previous afternoon had received instructions to have the airstrip ready, a few other KMAG

officers, and a great number of South Korean civilians met the first elements when they landed about 1100. [7]

A miscellaneous assortment of about a hundred Korean trucks and vehicles assembled by Colonel Emmerich transported the men of Task Force Smith the seventeen miles from the airstrip to the railroad station in Pusan. Cheering crowds lined the streets and waved happily to the American soldiers as they passed. The city was in gay spirits-flags, banners, streamers, and posters were

everywhere. Korean bands at the railroad station gave a noisy send-off as the loaded train pulled out at 2000.

The train with Task Force Smith aboard arrived at Taejon the next morning, 0800 2 July. There Lt. Col. LeRoy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Colonel Smith and took him to General Church's headquarters where the general was in conference with several American and ROK officers. Church greeted Smith and, pointing to a place on the map, explained, "We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROKs and give them moral support." [8]

Colonel Smith then suggested that he would like to go forward and look over the ground. While his men went to their bivouac area, Smith and his principal officers got into jeeps and set out over the eighty miles of bad, bumpy roads to Osan. All along the way they saw thousands of ROK soldiers and refugees cluttering the roads and moving south.

Three miles north of Osan, at a point where the road runs through a low saddle, drops down, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwon, Smith found an excellent infantry position which commanded both the highway and the railroad. An irregular ridge of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising about 300 feet above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwon. From this high point both the highway and railroad were in view almost

the entire distance to Suwon, eight miles to the north.

After looking over the ground, Smith issued verbal orders for organizing a position there. A flight of enemy fighters, red stars plainly visible on their wings, passed overhead, but their pilots apparently did not see the few men below. Its purpose accomplished, the group returned to the Taejon airstrip well after dark.

That night, 2 July, Smith received an order to take his men north by train to P'yongt'aek and Ansong. The former is 15 miles south, and the latter 20 miles southeast, of Osan. Smith loaded his men into trains and they rolled north into the night. One company dug in at P'yongt'aek; the other at Ansong 12 miles away. Smith established his command post with the group at P'yongt'aek on the main highway.

The next day at P'yongt'aek Colonel Smith and his men witnessed a demonstration of aerial destructiveness. A northbound ammunition train of nine boxcars on its way to ROK units pulled into P'yongt'aek. While the train waited for further instructions, four Mustangs flown by Royal Australian Air Force pilots made six strafing runs over it firing rockets and machine guns. The train was blown up, the station demolished, and parts of the town shot up. All night ammunition kept exploding. Many residents of P'yongt'aek died or were injured in this mistaken air strike. [9]

That same afternoon friendly air also attacked Suwon and strafed a South Korean truck column near the town. ROK rifle fire damaged one plane and forced the pilot to land at Suwon Airfield. There, KMAG and ROK officers "captured" a highly embarrassed American pilot. One KMAG officer with the ROK Army headquarters at Suwon said he was under attack by friendly planes five different times on 3 July. This same officer in a letter to a friend a few days later wrote of these misplaced air attacks, "The fly boys really had a field day! They hit friendly ammo dumps, gas dumps, the Suwon air strip, trains, motor columns, and KA [Korean Army] Hq." In the afternoon, four friendly jet planes made strikes on Suwon and along the Suwon-Osan highway setting fire to gasoline at the railroad station in Suwon and destroying buildings and injuring civilians. On the road they strafed and burned thirty South Korean trucks and killed 200

ROK soldiers. Because of these incidents throughout the day, General Church sent a strong protest to FEAF asking that air action be held to Han River bridges or northward. [10]

The next day, 4 July, Smith's divided command reunited at P'yongt'aek, and was joined there by a part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. This artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all of A Battery with 6 105-mm. howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lt. Col. Miller O. Perry. It had crossed from Japan on an LST 2 July, disembarking at Pusan late that night. Two trains the next day carried the unit

to Taejon. There General Church ordered Perry to join Smith at P'yongt'aek, and about 2100 that night Perry's artillery group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at P'yongt'aek, the train stopped at Songhwan-ni, where the artillerymen unloaded and drove on the six miles to P'yongt'aek before daylight. [11]

Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment loaded at Sasebo during the night of 1 July, and arrived at Pusan the next night. After Task Force Smith had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment, except A and D Companies which sailed from Moji, loaded at Sasebo 3 July and departed for Pusan, arriving there early the next morning. [12] General Dean also was on his way to Korea. Failing on 2 July to land at Taejon because his pilot could not find the airstrip in the dark, General Dean the next morning at Ashiya Air Base joined Capt. Ben L. Tufts on his way to Korea by General Almond's order to act as liaison between Army and the press. Tufts' pilot knew the Taejon airstrip and landed his plane there about 1030, 3 July. General Dean and Captain Tufts went directly to the two-story yellow brick building serving as General Church's ADCOM Headquarters. [13]

That afternoon a message from General MacArthur notified General Dean that United States Army Forces in Korea was activated under his command as of 0001 4 July. General Dean assumed command of USAFIK during the day and appointed General Church as Deputy Commander. Twenty-two other officers were named General and Special Staff officers of USAFIK. [14] ADCOM provided most of the officers for the USAFIK staff, but some KMAG officers also served on it. Most of the KMAG officers who had left Korea by air on 27 June returned aboard the ammunition ship Sergeant Keathley on 2 July. [15] By this time the ROK Army had assembled and partly reorganized about 68,000 men. Colonels Smith and Perry, and some others, went forward in the late afternoon of 4 July to make a final reconnaissance of the Osan position. At this time Perry selected the positions for his artillery. On the road ROK engineer groups were preparing demolitions on all bridges.

Back at Taejon General Dean, a big six-footer with a bristling crew cut cropping his sand-colored hair, and beanpole General Church, slightly stooped, always calm seemingly to the point of indifference, discussed the probability of imminent American combat with the enemy. The third general officer to come to the forward area in Korea, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, acting commanding general of the 24th Division artillery, now arrived in Taejon in the early afternoon.

General Dean decided to send Barth forward to represent him, and with instructions for Task Force Smith. So, at 1500 4 July, General Barth started north by jeep for P'yongt'aek. [16] When he found Smith, General Barth relayed his orders to "take up those good positions near Osan you told General Church about." [17]

A little after midnight the infantry and artillery of Task Force Smith moved out of P'yongt'aek. Colonel Smith had to commandeer Korean trucks and miscellaneous vehicles to mount his men. The native Korean drivers deserted when they found that the vehicles were going north. American soldiers took over in the drivers' seats. General Barth and Colonel Smith followed the task force northward. On the way, General Barth tried to halt the ROK demolition preparations by telling the engineer groups that he planned to use the bridges. At one bridge, after talk failed to influence the ROK engineers, Barth threw the boxes of dynamite into the river. It was only twelve miles to Osan, but it took two and a half hours to get there because ROK soldiers and civilians fleeing south filled the road and driving was under blackout conditions. [18]

About 0300 on 5 July, the delaying force reached the position which Smith had previously selected. The infantry units started setting up weapons and digging in at the pre-designated places. Colonel Perry moved his guns into the positions behind the infantry that he had selected the previous afternoon. All units were in place, but not completely dug in, before daylight straddling the Osan-Suwon road. [19]

In seeking the most favorable place to pass through the ridge, the railroad bent eastward away from the highway until it was almost a mile distant. There the railroad split into two single-track lines and passed over low ground between hills of the ridge line. On his left flank Colonel Smith placed one platoon of B Company on the high knob immediately west of the highway; east of the road were B Company's other two rifle platoons. Beyond them eastward to the railroad tracks were two platoons of C Company. This company's third platoon occupied a finger ridge running south, forming a refused right flank along the west side of the railroad track. Just east of the highway B Company emplaced one 75-mm. recoilless rifle; C Company emplaced the other 75-mm. recoilless rifle just west of the railroad. Colonel Smith placed the 4.2-inch mortars on the reverse, or south, slope of the ridge about 400 yards behind the center of B Company's

position. The infantry line formed a 1-mile front, not counting the refused right flank along the railroad track. [20] The highway, likely to be the critical axis of enemy advance, passed through the shallow saddle at the infantry position and then zigzagged gently downgrade northward around several knob-like spurs to low ground a little more than a mile away. There it crossed

to the east side of the railroad track and continued on over semi-level ground to Suwon.

Two thousand yards behind the infantry, Colonel Perry pulled four 105-mm. howitzers 150 yards to the left (west) off the highway over a small trail that only jeeps could travel. Two jeeps in tandem pulled the guns into place. Near a cluster of houses with rice paddies in front and low hills back of them, the men arranged the guns in battery position. Perry emplaced the fifth howitzer as an antitank gun on the west side of the road about halfway between the main battery position and the infantry. From there it could place direct fire on the highway where it passed through the saddle and the infantry positions. [21] Volunteers from the artillery Headquarters and Service Batteries made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined the infantry in their position.

The infantry parked most of their miscellaneous trucks and jeeps along the road just south of the saddle. The artillerymen left their trucks concealed in yards and sheds and behind Korean houses along the road just north of Osan. There were about 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition at the battery position and in two trucks parked inside a walled enclosure nearby. One or two truckloads more were in the vehicles parked among the houses just north of Osan. Nearly all this ammunition was high explosive (HE); only 6 rounds were high explosive antitank (HEAT), and all of it was taken to the forward gun. [22] When the 52d Field Artillery was loading out at Sasebo, Japan, the battalion ammunition officer drew all the HEAT ammunition available there-only 18 rounds. [23] He issued 6 rounds to A Battery, now on the point of engaging in the first battle between

American artillery and the Russian-built T34 tanks.

At the Osan position as rainy 5 July dawned were 540 Americans: 389 enlisted men and 17 officers among the infantry and 125 enlisted men and 9 officers among the artillerymen. [24] When first light came, the infantry test-fired their weapons and the artillerymen registered their guns. Then they ate their C ration breakfasts.

In spite of the rain Smith could see almost to Suwon. He first saw movement on the road in the distance near Suwon a little after 0700. In about half an hour a tank column, now easily discernible, approached the waiting Americans. In this first group there were eight tanks. About 0800 the men back in the artillery position received a call from the forward observer with the infantry for a fire mission. [25]

At 0816 the first American artillery fire of the Korean War hurtled through the air toward the North Korean tanks. The number two howitzer fired the first two rounds, and the other pieces then joined in the firing. The artillery took the tanks under fire at a range of approximately 4,000 yards, about 2,000 yards in front of the American infantry. [26] The forward observer quickly adjusted the fire and shells began landing among the tanks. But the watching infantrymen saw

the tanks keep on coming, undeterred by the exploding artillery shells.

To conserve ammunition Colonel Smith issued orders that the 75-mm. recoilless rifle covering the highway should withhold fire until the tanks closed to 700 yards. The tanks stayed in column, displayed little caution, and did not leave the road. The commander of the enemy tank column may have thought he had encountered only another minor ROK delaying position.

General Barth had gone back to the artillery just before the enemy came into view and did not know when he arrived there that an enemy force was approaching. After receiving reports from the forward observer that the artillery fire was ineffective against the tanks, he started back to alert the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, whose arrival he expected at P'yongt'aek during the night, against a probable breakthrough of the enemy tanks. [27]

When the enemy tank column approached within 700 yards of the infantry position, the two recoilless rifles took it under fire. They scored direct hits, but apparently did not damage the tanks which, firing their 85-mm. cannon and 7.62-mm. machine guns, rumbled on up the incline toward the saddle. When they were almost abreast of the infantry position, the lead tanks came under

2.36-inch rocket launcher fire. Operating a bazooka from the ditch along the east side of the road, 2d Lt. Ollie D. Connor, fired twenty-two rockets at approximately fifteen yards' range against the rear of the tanks where their armor was weakest. Whether they were effective is doubtful. The two lead tanks, however, were stopped just through the pass when they came under direct fire of

the single 105-mm. howitzer using HEAT ammunition. Very likely these artillery shells stopped the two tanks, although the barrage of close-range bazooka rockets may have damaged their tracks. [28]

The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road, clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This unidentified machine gunner probably was the first American ground soldier killed in action in Korea. [29] American fire killed the three North Koreans. The six rounds of HEAT ammunition at the forward gun were soon expended, leaving only the HE shells which ricocheted off the tanks. The third tank through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.

The tanks did not stop to engage the infantry; they merely fired on them as they came through. Following the first group of 8 tanks came others at short intervals, usually in groups of 4. These, too, went unhesitatingly through the infantry position and on down the road toward the artillery position. In all, there were 33 tanks in the column. The last passed through the infantry position

by 0900, about an hour after the lead tanks had reached the saddle. In this hour, tank fire had killed or wounded approximately twenty men in Smith's position. [30]

Earlier in the morning it was supposed to have been no more than an academic question as to what would happen if tanks came through the infantry to the artillery position. Someone in the artillery had raised this point to be answered by the infantry, "Don't worry, they will never get back to you." One of the artillerymen later expressed the prevailing opinion by saying, "Everyone

thought the enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting." [31] Word now came to the artillerymen from the forward observer that tanks were through the infantry and to be ready for them.

The first tanks cut up the telephone wire strung along the road from the artillery to the infantry and destroyed this communication. The radios were wet and functioning badly; now only the jeep radio worked. Communication with the infantry after 0900 was spotty at best, and, about 1100, it ceased altogether. The tanks came on toward the artillery pieces, which kept them under fire but

could not stop them. About 500 yards from the battery, the tanks stopped behind a little hill seeking protection from direct fire. Then, one at a time, they came down the road with a rush, hatches closed, making a run to get past the battery position. Some fired their 85-mm cannon, others only their machine guns. Their aim was haphazard in most cases for the enemy tankers had not located the gun positions. Some of the tank guns even pointed toward the opposite side of

the road. Only one tank stopped momentarily at the little trail where the howitzers had pulled off the main road as though it meant to try to overrun the battery which its crew evidently had located. Fortunately, however, it did not leave the road but instead, after a moment, continued on toward Osan. The 105-mm. howitzers fired at ranges of 150-300 yards as the tanks went by, but the shells only jarred the tanks and bounced off. Altogether, the tanks did not average more than one round each in return fire. [32]

Three bazooka teams from the artillery had posted themselves near the road before the tanks appeared. When word came that the tanks were through the infantry, two more bazooka teams, one led by Colonel Perry and the other by Sgt. Edwin A. Eversole, started to move into position. The first tank caught both Perry and Eversole in the rice paddy between the howitzers and the highway. When Eversole's first bazooka round bounced off the turret of the tank, he said

that tank suddenly looked to him "as big as a battleship." This tank fired its 85-mm. cannon, cutting down a telephone pole which fell harmlessly over Eversole who had flung himself down into a paddy drainage ditch. A 105-mm. shell hit the tracks of the third tank and stopped it. The other tanks in this group went on through. The four American howitzers remained undamaged. [33]

After these tanks had passed out of sight, Colonel Perry took an interpreter and worked his way up close to the immobilized enemy tank. Through the interpreter, he called on the crew to come out and surrender. There was no response. Perry then ordered the howitzers to destroy the tank. After three rounds had hit the tank, two men jumped out of it and took cover in a culvert. Perry sent a squad forward and it killed the two North Koreans. [34]

During this little action, small arms fire hit Colonel Perry in the right leg. Refusing to be evacuated, he hobbled around or sat against the base of a tree orders and instructions in preparation for the appearance of more tanks. [35] In about ten minutes the second wave of tanks followed the last of the first group. This time there were more-"a string of them," as one man expressed it. They came in ones, twos, and threes, close together with no apparent interval or

organization.

When the second wave of tanks came into view, some of the howitzer crew members

started to "take off." As one present said, the men were "shy about helping." [36] The officers had to drag the ammunition up and load the pieces themselves. The senior noncommissioned officers fired the pieces. The momentary panic soon passed and, with the good example and strong leadership of Colonel Perry and 1st Lt. Dwain L. Scott before them, the men returned to their positions. Many of the second group of tanks did not fire on the artillery at all. Again, the 105-mm. howitzers could not stop the oncoming tanks. They did, however hit another in its tracks, disabling it in front of the artillery position. [37] Some of the tanks had one or two infantrymen on their decks. Artillery fire blew off or killed most of them; some lay limply dead as the tanks went by; others slowly jolted off onto the road. [38] Enemy tank fire caused a building to burn near the battery position and a nearby dump of about 300 rounds of artillery shells began to explode. The last of the tanks passed the artillery position by 1015. [39] These tanks were from the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, in support of the N.K. 4th Division. [40]

Colonel Perry estimates that his four howitzers fired an average of 4 to 6 rounds at each of the tanks, and that they averaged perhaps 1 round each in return. After the last tank was out of sight, rumbling on toward Osan, the score stood as follows: the forward 105-mm. howitzer, and 2.36-inch bazookas fired from the infantry position, had knocked out and left burning 1 tank and damaged another so that it could not move; the artillery had stopped 3 more in front of the battery position, while 3 others though damaged had managed to limp out of range toward Osan. This made 4 tanks destroyed or immobilized and 3 others slightly damaged but serviceable out of a total of 33.

For their part, the tanks had destroyed the forward 105-mm. howitzer and wounded one of its crew members, had killed or wounded an estimated twenty infantrymen, and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry position. At the main battery position the tanks had slightly damaged one of the four guns by a near miss. [41] Only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded at the battery position.

Task Force Smith was not able to use any antitank mines-one of the most effective methods of defense against tanks-as there were none in Korea at the time. Colonel Perry was of the opinion that a few well-placed antitank mines would have stopped the entire armored column in the road. [42]

After the last of the tank column had passed through the infantry position and the artillery and tank fire back toward Osan had subsided, the American positions became quiet again. There was no movement of any kind discernible on the road ahead toward Suwon. But Smith knew that he must expect enemy infantry soon. In the steady rain that continued throughout the morning, the men deepened their foxholes and otherwise improved their positions. Perhaps an hour after the enemy tank column had moved through, Colonel Smith, from his observation post, saw movement on the road far away, near Suwon. This slowly became discernible as a long column of trucks and foot soldiers. Smith estimated the column to be about six miles long. [43] It took an hour for the head of the column to reach a point 1,000 yards in front of the American infantry. There were three tanks in front, followed by a long line of trucks, and, behind these, several miles of marching infantry. There could be no doubt about it, this was a major force of the North Korean Army pushing south-the 16th and 18th Regiments of the N.K. 4th Division, as learned later. [44]

Whether the enemy column knew that American ground troops had arrived in Korea and were present in the battle area is unknown. Later, Sr. Col. Lee Hak Ku, in early July operations officer of the N.K. II Corps, said he had no idea that the United States would intervene in the war, that nothing had been said about possible U.S. intervention, and that he believed it came as a surprise to North Korean authorities. [45]

With battle against a greatly superior number of enemy troops only a matter of minutes away, the apprehensions of the American infantry watching the approaching procession can well be imagined. General MacArthur later referred to his commitment of a handful of American ground troops as "that arrogant display of strength" which he hoped would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force was at hand. [46]

When the convoy of enemy trucks was about 1,000 yards away, Colonel Smith, to use his own words, "threw the book at them." Mortar shells landed among the trucks and .50-caliber machine gun bullets swept the column. Trucks burst into flames. Men were blown into the air; others sprang from their vehicles and jumped into ditches alongside the road. The three tanks moved to within 200-300 yards of the American positions and began raking the ridge line with cannon and

machine gun fire. Behind the burning vehicles an estimated 1,000 enemy infantry detrucked and started to deploy. Behind them other truckloads of infantry stopped and waited. It was now about 1145.

The enemy infantry began moving up the finger ridge along the east side of the road. There, some of them set up a base of fire while others fanned out to either side in a double enveloping movement. The American fire broke up all efforts of the enemy infantry to advance frontally. Strange though it was, the North Koreans made no strong effort to attack the flanks; they seemed bent on getting around rather than closing on them. Within an hour, about 1230, the enemy appeared in force on the high hill to the west of the highway overlooking and dominating the knob on that side held by a platoon of B Company. Smith, observing this, withdrew the platoon to the east side of the road. Maj. Floyd Martin, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, meanwhile supervised the carrying of available ammunition stocks to a central and protected area back of

the battalion command post. The 4.2-inch mortars were moved up closer, and otherwise the men achieved a tighter defense perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. [48]

In the exchange of fire that went on an increasing amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the American position. Enemy machine guns on hills overlooking the right flank now also began firing on Smith's men. Earlier, Colonel Perry had twice sent wire parties to repair the communications wire between the artillery and the infantry, but both had returned saying they had been fired upon. At 1300 Perry sent a third group led by his Assistant S-3. This time he ordered the men to put in a new line across the paddies east of the road and to avoid the area where the earlier parties said they had received fire. [49]

About 1430, Colonel Smith decided that if any of his command was to get out, the time to move was at hand. Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and moving toward his rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of him along the road stretching back toward Suwon; and his small arms ammunition was nearly gone. A large enemy tank force was already in his rear. He had no communications, not even with Colonel Perry's artillery a mile behind him, and he could hope for no reinforcements. Perry's artillery had fired on the enemy infantry as long as the fire direction communication functioned properly, but this too had failed soon after the infantry fight began. The weather prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene. Had it been present it could have worked havoc with the enemy-clogged road. [50]

Smith planned to withdraw his men by leapfrogging units off the ridge, each jump of the withdrawal covered by protecting fire of the next unit ahead. The selected route of withdrawal was toward Osan down the finger ridge on the right flank, just west of the railroad track. First off the hill was C Company, followed by the medics, then battalion headquarters, and, finally, B Company, except its 2d Platoon which never received the withdrawal order. A platoon

messenger returned from the company command post and reported to 2d Lt. Carl F.

Bernard that there was no one at the command post and that the platoon was the only group left in position. After confirming this report Bernard tried to withdraw his men. At the time of the withdrawal the men carried only small arms and each averaged two or three clips of ammunition. They abandoned all crew-served weapons-recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They had no alternative but to leave behind all the dead and about twenty-five to thirty wounded litter cases. A medical sergeant, whose name unfortunately has not been determined, voluntarily remained with the latter. The slightly wounded moved out with the main units, but when enemy fire dispersed some of the groups many of the wounded dropped behind and were seen no more. [51]

Task Force Smith suffered its heaviest casualties in the withdrawal. Some of the enemy machine gun fire was at close quarters. The captain and pitcher of the regimental baseball team, 1st Lt. Raymond "Bodie" Adams, used his pitching arm to win the greatest victory of his career when he threw a grenade forty yards into an enemy machine gun position, destroying the gun and killing the crew. This particular gun had caused heavy casualties.

About the time B Company, the initial covering unit, was ready to withdraw, Colonel Smith left the hill, slanted off to the railroad track and followed it south to a point opposite the artillery position. From there he struck off west through the rice paddies to find Colonel Perry and tell him the infantry was leaving. While crossing the rice paddies Smith met Perry's wire party and together they hurried to Perry's artillery battery. Smith had assumed that the enemy tanks had destroyed all the artillery pieces and had made casualties of most of the men. His surprise was complete when he found that all the guns at this battery position were operable and that only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded. Enemy infantry had not yet appeared at the artillery position. [52]

Upon receiving Smith's order to withdraw, the artillerymen immediately made ready to go. They removed the sights and breech locks from the guns and carried them and the aiming circles to their vehicles. [53] Smith, Perry, and the artillerymen walked back to the outskirts of Osan where they found the artillery trucks as they had left them, only a few being slightly damaged by tank and machine gun fire.

Perry and Smith planned to take a road at the south edge of Osan to Ansong, assuming that the enemy tanks had gone down the main road toward P'yongt'aek. Rounding a bend in the road near the southern edge of the town, but short of the Ansong road, Smith and Perry in the lead vehicle came suddenly upon three enemy tanks halted just ahead of them. Some or all of the tank crew members were standing about smoking cigarettes. The little column of vehicles turned around

quickly, and, without a shot being fired, drove back to the north edge of Osan. There they turned into a small dirt road that led eastward, hoping that it would get them to Ansong.

The column soon came upon groups of infantry from Smith's battalion struggling over the hills and through the rice paddies. Some of the men had taken off their shoes in the rice paddies, others were without head covering of any kind, while some had their shirts off. The trucks stopped and waited while several of these groups came up and climbed on them. About 100 infantrymen joined the artillery group in this way. Then the vehicles continued on unmolested, arriving at Ansong

after dark. [54] There was no pursuit. The North Korean infantry occupied the vacated positions, and busied themselves in gathering trophies, apparently content to have driven off the enemy force.

The next morning, 6 July, Colonel Smith and his party went on to Ch'onan. Upon arrival there a count revealed that he had 185 men. Subsequently, Capt. Richard Dashmer, C Company commander, came in with 65 men, increasing the total to 250. There were about 150 men killed, wounded, or missing from Colonel Smith's infantry force when he took a second count later in the day. The greatest loss was in B Company. [55] Survivors straggled in to American lines at P'yongt'aek, Ch'onan, Taejon, and other points in southern Korea during the next several days. Lieutenant Bernard and twelve men of the reserve platoon of B Company reached Ch'onan two days after the Osan fight. Five times he and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks. They arrived at Ch'onan only half an hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast. [56]

None of the 5 officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back. On 7 July 5 officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing. [57] The N.K. 4th Division and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. [58] A diary taken from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5 Jul 50 . . . we met vehicles and American PWs. We also saw some American dead. We found 4 of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there was a great battle." [59]

**Endnotes:**

[1] Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. III, p. 1, citing Msg CX 56978, CINCFE to CG 8th Army, 30 Jun 50.

[2] EUSAK WD, Opns Ord 2, 010315K Jul 50.

[3] Ibid., troop list accompanying Opns Ord 2; Ibid., Prologue, 25 Jun-13 Jul 50, Incl I, Rpt of G-1 Activities, 1-12 Jul 50, pp. 1-2.

[4] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ltr, Smith to author, 4 May 52.

[7]Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Emmerich, 5 Dec 51. The 24th Division War Diary, 1 July 1950, erroneously states that 24 C-54 planes were available for the airlift. Smith denies this.

[8] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[9] Ibid.; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, 25 Jun-3 Jul 50, Msg 239, msg from Gen Church to FEAF, 3 Jul 50; N. Bartlett, ed., With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), p. 174.

[10] Ltr, Scott to friend, ca. 6-7 Jul 50; Interv, author with Hazlett, 11 Jun 54 (Colonel Hazlett was in the Suwon area on 3 July); Msg 239, 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 25 Jun-3 Jul 50.

[11] Ltr, Col Perry to author, 25 May 52; Intervs, author with 1st Lt Edwin A. Eversole, 52d FA Bn, 1 Aug 51, and Perry, 13 Dec 51.

[12] Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. III, pp. 4-5; Maj Gen Richard W. Stephens, MS review comments, Dec 57.

[13] Interv, author with Capt Tufts, 6 Aug 51; Capt Tufts, notes for author, 8 Aug 51 (8 typescript pages); W. F. Dean and W. L. Worden, General Dean's Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 18-19.

[14] 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, Msg 242, 3 Jul 50; USAFIK GO 1, 4 Jul 50, and SO 1, 4 Jul 50.

[15] Church MS; Sawyer, KMAG MS; Schnabel FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. IV, pp. 8-9.

[16] Brig Gen G. B. Barth, 25th Div Unit Hist, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea (prepared in 1951), MS in OCMH (hereafter cited as Barth MS); Gen Barth, MS review comments, 24 Feb 58.

[17] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51; Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, p. 20. Barth says Smith had already started his men forward when he arrived at P'yongt'aek. MS review comments, 24 Feb 58.

[18] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51; Barth MS, p. 1; Barth, MS review comments, 24 Feb 58.

[19] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[20] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[21] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51; Ltr, Perry to author, 5 Dec 51 The sixth howitzer had been left at P'yongt'aek because of trouble with the prime mover.

[22] Ltr, Perry to author, 5 Dec 51; Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[23] Interv, author with 1st Lt Percy R. Hare, 5 Aug 51. (Hare was Ammunition and Trains Officer, 52d Field Artillery Battalion, when the battalion left for Korea.)

[24] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51; Ltr, Perry to author, 5 Dec. 51. The official army records contain many inaccuracies with respect to Task Force Smith. To note only a few: one FEC G-2 report gives the date of the Osan action as 6 July, the 24th Division War Diary gives it as 4 July. Both are wrong. Several sources state that enemy tank fire destroyed all the American 105-mm. howitzers at Osan; only one was destroyed.

[25] Ltr, Smith to author, 4 May 52; Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51. Eversole says he looked at his watch when the request for a fire mission came in from the forward observer and noted the time as 0745, Barth thinks the time was closer to 0800. Smith

told the author he first saw the enemy column about 0700 and that it was about half an hour in moving up in front of his position. In an interview with the 24th Division G-2 on 7 July 1950, two days after the action, Colonel Smith gave the time as 0745 when the tank column approached his position. See 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 6-10 Jul 50, entry 64, 071720. A telephone call from USAFIK headquarters in Taejon to GHQ in Tokyo at 1105, 5 July, gave the time of initial contact as 0818. Memo, Gen Wright, FEC C-3, for CofS ROK, 051130 Jul 50.

[26] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51; Barth, MS review comments, 28 Feb 58. Knowing the action was of historic importance, Barth looked at his watch when the artillery opened fire. He says it was 0816.

[27] Barth MS; Interv, author with Capt Ben M. Huckabay, 2 Aug 51. (Huckabay was a corporal at Osan with the 52d Field Artillery.)

[28] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Perry, 13 Dec 51. Smith told the author that the bazooka ammunition had deteriorated because of age.

[29] Interv, author with 1st Lt Lawrence C. Powers, 2 Aug 51. Powers was Headquarters Company Communications Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, at Osan, 5 July. He said he saw this action.

[30] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51, and Sgt Jack L. Ruffner, 2 Aug 51.

[31] Interv, author with Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[32] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51; Ltr,

Perry to author, 5 Dec 51.

[33] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, Eversole, 1 Aug 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51.

[34] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[35] Intervs, author with Eversole, 1 Aug 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51. Special Order 76, 20 September 1950, awarded Colonel Perry the Distinguished Service Cross.

[36] Interv, author with Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[37] Intervs, author with Eversole, 1 Aug 51, and Perry, 13 Dec 51. The 24th Division General Order 111, 30 August 1950, awarded Lieutenant Scott the Silver Star for action at Osan, 5 July 1950.

[38] Intervs, author with Eversole, 1 Aug 51, and Perry, 13 Dec 51.

[39] Ibid.

[40] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (Enemy Forces), p. 37.

[41] Ltr, Perry to author, 5 Dec 51; Interv, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51.

[42] Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Powers, 2 Aug 51: Ltr, Smith to author, 4 May 52.

[43] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[44] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 45. The division's third regiment, the 5th, remained behind in Suwon.

[45] ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 9 (N.K. Forces), pp. 158-74, Interrog of Sr Col Lee Hak Ku.

[46] Senate MacArthur Hearings, pt. I, p. 231.

[47] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 45; 24th Div G-3 Jnl, Rpt of Interrog of Col smith, 071720, entry 64; Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[48] 21st Inf Regt WD, 5 Jul 50; Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Powers, 2 Aug 51.

[49] Ltr, Perry to author, 25 May 52.

[50] Intervs. author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Smith, 7 Oct 51.

[51] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, Eversole, 1 Aug 51, and Powers, 2 Aug 51; Capt Carl Bernard, MS review comments, 24 Feb 58.

[52] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51.

[53] Ltr, Perry to author, 25 May 52; Intervs, author with Perry, 13 Dec 51, and Eversole, 1 Aug 51.

[54] Intervs, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51, and Huckabay, 2 Aug 51.

[55] Interv, author with Smith, 7 Oct 51. Smith estimated his losses at 155 men. A verbal report by the 24th Division G-1, recorded in a penciled journal entry in the division G-3 Journal, entry 71, 071500, gave the total missing from the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, as 148 enlisted men and 5 officers. This total included 63 enlisted men and 2 officers from B Company, and 32 enlisted men and 2 officers from C Company.

[56] Bernard, MS review comments, 24 Feb, 58; Lt. Bernard as told to Sgt. Al Mullikin, "The First Brutal Weeks in Korea," the Washington Post, June 24, 1954; Interv, author with Smith, 7

Oct 51.

[57] Ltr, Perry to author, 25 May 52; Interv, author with Huckabay, 2 Aug 51; 24th Div G-3 Jnl, Msg 67, 071935; 24th Div G-2 PW Interrog file, 6-22 Jul 50 (Paik In Soo); New York Times, July 6, 1950. One group of 36 Americans led by 2d Lt. Jansen C. Cox was captured on 6 July southeast of Osan

[58] ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (Enemy Docs), p. 3, Casualty Rpt for 16th, 17th, 18th Regts, Arty Regt and attached units, 25 Jun-10 Jul 50. A few of the enemy casualties given for Osan may have occurred at P'yongt'aek the next day, but their losses at the latter place could not have been numerous.

[59] 24th Div G-2 PW Interrog File, 6-22 Jul 50. On 11 July an enemy radio broadcast from Seoul first used PW's for propaganda purposes. Capt. Ambrose H. Nugent, of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion, read a statement of about a thousand words in English. The Seoul radio said

Nugent was one of seventy-two Americans captured at Osan from the 21st Infantry and the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. See New York Times, July 6, 1950, and the New York Herald-Tribune, July 12, 1950.

**For Further Information:**

# (Source Documents for this compilation)

Books:

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| **American Military History Center.** [***The Korean War, 1950-1953***](http://metalab.unc.edu/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/korean.war/korea.txt)**. 1989.** |
| **James F. Schnabel.** [***Policy and Direction: The First Year***](http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/p&d.htm)**. Library of Congress 1972. Limited combat under the threat of nuclear holocaust.** |
| **Army Historical Series. *Combat Actions in Korea*. 1954, 1970.  Intimate and objective accounts of small-unit combat action.** |
| **John G. Westover.** [***Combat Support in Korea***](http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/BOOKS/KOREA/22_1_int.htm)**. Facsimile Reprint, 1987, U.S. Army In Action Series. Contribution of support units.** |
| **Pears and Kirkland; Anthology.** [***Korea Remembered***](http://www.ffasfs.com.au/korearemembered.htm)**.  Recollections and reminiscences of some of the seventeen thousand Australian military personnel who served in the Korean War.**  </TBODY> |
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| Clay Blair. *The Forgotten War.* Times Books, 1987 |
| **David Douglas Duncan. *This Is War: A Photo-Narrative* Photos taken by ex-Marine, while photographer with 5th Marines in Pusan, Inchon and Chosin battles. Out of print, but available in libraries or** [**old books**](http://www.bibliofind.com/)**. Outstanding.** |
| Dvorchak, Robert J. *The Battle for Korea.* Combined Books, Pa. |
| **Fehrenbach, T.R. *This Kind of War.*** [**Recently re-issued**](http://www.amazon.com/) **KW history at the platoon leader level, based on small-unit actions. A very good read, a soldier's read.** |
| D.M. Giangreco. *War in Korea 1950-1953.* Ringier America, Inc. 1990. |
| George, Alexander L. *Chinese Communist Army in Action*. The Korean War and its Aftermath. New York, NY; Columbia University Press, 1969. |
| Hammel, Eric. *Chosin.* Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA. 1981. Definitive (though politically biased) action narrative of 1st Mar Div at Chosin |
| **Hermes, Walter G. *United States Army in the Korean War: Truce, Tent and Fighting Front.* Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992. The definitive account of action during the truce talks along the** [**MLR**](http://rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/mlr.htm) |
| Joseph C. Goulden. *Korea: The Untold Story of the War.* Times Books. 1982. |

Web Pages:

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[www.abmc.gov](http://www.abmc.gov)

[www.rt.66.com/~korteng](http://www.rt.66.com/~korteng)

[www.dod.gov](http://www.dod.gov)

[www.britanica.com](http://www.britanica.com)

www.korea50.army.mil

Vertical Files:

Ranger John Lockwood’s Files in Jefferson Memorial Library